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HEARING ON “ENHANCED SUPERVISION: A NEW REGIME FOR
REGULATING LARGE, COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,”
ON DECEMBER 7, 2011, BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
UNITED STATES SENATE
WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.
Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School
Washington, D.C.
Thank you very much for inviting me to participate in this important hearing. My
testimony will address the following topics related to the regulation of large, complex financial
institutions (“LCFIs”): (1) the extraordinary governmental assistance provided to “too big to fail”
(“TBTF”) financial institutions during the financial crisis, (2) the dangerous distortions in our
financial markets created by explicit and implicit subsidies for TBTF institutions, (3) the
inadequacy of the regulatory regime established by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) to solve the TBTF problem, and (4) a proposed new
set of regulatory reforms that would require systemically important financial institutions
(“SIFIs”) to internalize the costs of their risk-taking and prevent SIFI-owned banks from
transferring their safety net subsidies to their nonbank affiliates.
My proposed approach, which relies on the “narrow bank” concept, would create a true
“market test” for SIFIs. I believe that test would cause many SIFIs to break up voluntarily if
they could not produce satisfactory returns to investors after losing their access to extensive
public subsidies. My proposed approach is similar to (a) a recent report by the U.K. Independent
Commission on Banking (the “Vickers Report”), which advocates a “ring-fencing” concept that
would require financial conglomerates to separate their “utility” retail banking operations from

their “casino” wholesale activities in the capital markets, and (b) proposed “core banking“
legislation introduced by Senator (then-Representative) Charles Schumer in 1991.
1.

TBTF Financial Institutions Received Extraordinary Governmental Assistance
during the Financial Crisis
The federal government provided massive amounts of financial assistance to LCFIs during

the financial crisis. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) provided $290 billion of
capital assistance to the 19 largest U.S. banks (each with more than $100 billion of assets) and
the largest U.S. insurance company, American International Group (“AIG”). Federal regulators
enabled the same 19 banks and GE Capital (a huge finance company owned General Electric) to
issue $290 billion of FDIC-guaranteed, low-interest debt. In contrast, smaller banks (with assets
under $100 billion) received only $41 billion of TARP capital assistance and issued only $11
billion of FDIC-guaranteed debt.1
The Federal Reserve System (“Fed”) also provided massive amounts of credit assistance to
financial institutions through a series of emergency lending programs. The total amount of Fed
emergency credit reached a single-day peak of $1.2 trillion in December 2008. The Fed
extended the vast majority of this emergency credit to large U.S. and European banks and
provided very little help to smaller institutions. The highest daily amount of the Fed‟s

Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem,” 35
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 707, 737-38 (2010) [hereinafter Wilmarth, “Reforming Financial
Regulation”], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1645921. Federal regulators took an extraordinary
step in allowing GE Capital to issue $55 billion of FDIC-guaranteed, low-interest debt securities. GE
Capital issued the debt securities by virtue of its ownership of two FDIC-insured depository institutions (a
thrift and an industrial bank) located in Utah. Regulators granted GE Capital special permission to
participate in the FDIC‟s debt guarantee program even though GE Capital was not a bank holding
company and therefore did not meet the general terms and conditions for participation in the program.
Indeed, GE Capital could not become a bank holding company because its parent, General Electric, is an
industrial conglomerate that is barred by statute from owning banks. Id. at 738 n.122, 774 n.260.
1
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emergency credit to the ten largest U.S. commercial and investment banks reached $669 billion,
representing more than half of the daily peak amount for all Fed lending programs.2
The Fed and the Treasury also supported financial institutions and the financial markets by
purchasing more than $1.5 trillion of direct obligations and mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”)
issued by government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”). In combination, the federal government
provided more than $6 trillion of support to financial institutions during the financial crisis, if
such support is measured by the peak amounts of outstanding assistance under TARP capital
programs , Fed emergency lending programs, FDIC debt guarantees, and other asset purchase
and guarantee programs.3 European nations similarly provided more than $4 trillion of financial
support to their financial institutions by the end of 2009.4
Federal regulators acted most dramatically in rescuing LCFIs that were threatened with
failure. U.S. authorities bailed out two of the three largest U.S. banks – Bank of America
(“BofA”) and Citigroup – as well as AIG. In addition, federal regulators provided financial
support for emergency acquisitions of two other major banks (Wachovia and National City), the
two largest thrifts (Washington Mutual (“WaMu”) and Countrywide), and two of the five largest
securities firms (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch). Regulators also approved emergency
conversions of two other leading securities firms (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) into
Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, “Wall Street Aristocracy Got $1.2 Trillion in Secret Fed Loans,”
Bloomberg.com, Aug. 22, 2011; Bob Ivry, Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, “Secret Fed Loans Helped
Banks Net $13 Billion,” Bloomberg.com, Nov. 27, 2011.
3
The “high-water mark” of the combined programs, based on the largest outstanding amount of each
program at any one time, was $6.3 trillion. The federal government‟s maximum potential exposure under
those programs was $23.9 trillion. Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (“SIGTARP”), Quarterly Report to Congress, July 21, 2010, at 116-19, 118 tbl. 3.1.
4
Adrian Blundell-Wignall et al., “The Elephant in the Room: The Need to Deal with What Banks Do,” 2
Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development Journal: Financial Market Trends, Vol. 2009,
No. 2, at 1, 4-5, 14, 15 tbl.4, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/8/44357464.pdf (stating that
the U.S. provided $6.4 trillion of assistance to financial institutions through capital infusions, asset
purchases, asset guarantees, and debt guarantees as of October 2009, while the United Kingdom and
European nations provided $4.3 trillion of such assistance).
2
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bank holding companies (“BHCs”), thereby placing those institutions under the FRB‟s protective
umbrella.5
The federal government further publicly guaranteed that none of the 19 largest banks
would be allowed to fail. When federal regulators announced their “stress tests” in early 2009,
they declared that the Treasury Department would provide any additional capital that was needed
to ensure the survival of all 19 banks. Regulators also stated that they would not impose
regulatory sanctions on the top 19 banks under the “prompt corrective action” (“PCA”) regime
established by Congress in 1991, despite the non-discretionary nature of those sanctions. Instead
of issuing public enforcement orders, regulators entered into private and confidential
“memoranda of understanding” with BofA and Citigroup despite the gravely weakened
conditions of both banks. Thus, federal regulators gave white-glove treatment to the 19 largest
banks and unequivocally promised that they would survive.6
In stark contrast, federal regulators imposed PCA orders and other public enforcement
sanctions on hundreds of community banks and allowed many of those institutions to fail.7
Almost 350 FDIC-insured depository institutions failed between January 1, 2008 and March 31,
2011.8 Only one of those institutions – WaMu, a large thrift institution – had more than $50
billion of assets.9 In view of the massive TBTF assistance that the federal government provided
to our largest banks, it is small wonder that those banks enjoy a decisive advantage in funding
costs over smaller banks. As FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair pointed out in a speech on May 5,

Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-toFail Problem,” 89 Oregon Law Review 951, 958-59, 983 (2011) [hereinafter Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank”],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719126.
6
Id. at 958-59, 983; Wilmarth, “Reforming Financial Regulation,” supra note 1, at 712-13, 743-44.
7
Wilmarth, “Reforming Financial Regulation,” supra note 1, at 744, 744 n.145.
8
5 FDIC Quarterly No. 2 (2011), at 16 (Table II-B).
9
2 FDIC Quarterly No. 4 (2008), at 14 (referring to the failure of Washington Mutual Bank, with $307
billion of assets, on Sept. 25, 2008).
5
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2011, “In the fourth quarter of [2010], the average interest cost of funding earning assets for
banks with more than $100 billion in assets was about half the average for community banks
with less than $1 billion in assets.”10
When the federal government finally promised to help community banks, it failed to
deliver. On February 2, 2010, President Obama announced a new program that would use $30
billion of TARP funds to assist community banks in making small business loans.11 However, in
September 2011, the Treasury Department shut down the Small Business Lending Fund after
providing only $4.2 billion – just 14% of the promised amount – to community banks. Members
of Congress strongly criticized the Treasury Department for long delays in approving
applications by community banks and for imposing onerous conditions on applicants.12
2.

TBTF Subsidies Distort Our Financial Markets and Create Perverse Incentives for
Excessive Risk-Taking and Unhealthy Consolidation
At the height of the financial crisis in March 2009, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke admitted

that “the too-big-to-fail issue has emerged as an enormous problem” because “it reduces market
discipline and encourages excessive risk-taking” by TBTF firms.13 Several months later,
Governor Mervyn King of the Bank of England condemned the perverse incentives created by
TBTF subsidies in even stronger terms. Governor King maintained that “[t]he massive support
extended to the banking sector around the world, while necessary to avert economic disaster, has

Sheila C. Bair, “We Must Resolve to End Too Big to Fail,” 5 FDIC Quarterly No. 2 (2011), at 25, 26
(reprinting speech delivered on May 5, 2011).
11
Cheryl Bolen, “Troubled Asset Relief Program: White House Explains $30 Billion Plan To Expand
Bank Loans to Small Businesses,” 94 BNA’s Banking Report 262 (Feb. 9, 2010).
12
Kevin Wack, “Lending Fund Puts Geithner on the Defensive,” American Banker, Oct. 19, 2011.
13
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Financial Reform to Address
Systemic Risk, Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm.
10
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created possibly the biggest moral hazard in history.”14 He further argued that TBTF subsidies
provided a likely explanation for decisions by LCFIs to engage in high-risk strategies during the
credit boom:
Why were banks willing to take risks that proved so damaging to themselves and
the rest of the economy? One of the key reasons – mentioned by market
participants in conversations before the crisis hit – is that incentives to manage
risk and to increase leverage were distorted by the implicit support or guarantee
provided by government to creditors of banks that were seen as „too important to
fail.‟ . . . Banks and their creditors knew that if they were sufficiently important to
the economy or the rest of the financial system, and things went wrong, the
government would always stand behind them. And they were right.15
Industry studies and anecdotal evidence confirm that TBTF subsidies create significant
economic distortions and promote moral hazard. In recent years, and particularly during the
present crisis, LCFIs have operated with much lower capital ratios and have benefited from a
much lower cost of funds, compared with smaller banks. In addition, credit ratings agencies and
bond market investors have given preferential treatment to TBTF institutions because of the
explicit and implicit government backing they receive.16
A recent study shows that large banks have received huge benefits from the implicit
TBTF subsidy over the past two decades.17 This study, which analyzed publicly-traded bonds
issued by U.S. banks between 1990 and 2010, concluded that bond investors expected the federal
government to support the largest banks throughout that period. Although the largest banks

14

Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, Speech to Scottish Business Organizations in
Edinburgh 4 (Oct. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech406.pdf [hereinafter King 2009
Speech]. See also Richard S. Carnell, Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Law of Banking and
Financial Institutions 326 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining that “moral hazard” results from the fact that
“[i]nsurance changes the incentives of the person insured . . . . [I]f you no longer fear a harm [due to
insurance], you no longer have an incentive to take precautions against it”).
15
King 2009 Speech, supra note 144, at 3.
16
Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 981-84 (citing studies and other evidence).
17
A. Joseph Warburton & Daniz Anginer, “The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of
Implicit State Guarantees” (Nov. 18, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656.
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pursued riskier strategies, they issued bonds with significantly lower yield spreads over Treasury
bonds, compared to bonds issued by smaller banks.18 Additionally, the authors found that bond
investors responded significantly to Fitch‟s “issuer” ratings that included the expectation of
governmental support for the biggest banks, but bond investors did not respond significantly to
Fitch‟s “individual” ratings based on the standalone strength of the same banks. In other words,
“investors do not price the true, intrinsic ability of a [big] bank to repay its debts, but instead
price implicit government support for the bank.”19
The authors determined that the implicit TBTF subsidy gave the largest banks
an annual [average] funding cost advantage of approximately 16 basis points before
the financial crisis, increasing to 88 basis points during the crisis, peaking at more
than 100 basis points in 2008. The total value of the subsidy amounted to about $4
billion per year before the crisis, increasing to $60 billion [annually] during the
crisis, topping $84 billion in 2008.20
Moreover, the authors found that “[t]he passage of Dodd-Frank in July of 2010 did not eliminate
investors‟ expectations of government support. In fact, expectations of government support rose
in 2010 [compared to 2009].”21 The authors concluded that the value of the implicit TBTF
subsidy to large banks was highest during times of financial crisis (i.e., the 1980s, 1997-98,
2000-02, and 2007-10). However, the subsidy “persists even during times of relative tranquility”
and therefore represents “an ongoing wealth transfer” from taxpayers to large banks. 22
The financial crisis has vividly illustrated the tendency of LCFIs to exploit their explicit
safety net subsidies (i.e., federal deposit insurance and access to the Fed‟s discount window) and
their implicit TBTF subsidy by using their access to low-cost funds to finance high-risk

18

Id. at 3, 10-11, 14-15.
Id. at 3, 15-17.
20
Id. at 4, 12.
21
Id. at 19, 33 (Figure 4).
22
Id. at 18-20, 33 (Figure 4).
19
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activities.23 As I have explained in previous articles, LCFIs were “the primary private-sector
catalysts for the destructive credit boom that led to the subprime financial crisis, and they
[became] the epicenter of the current global financial mess.”24 Eighteen major LCFIs –
including ten leading U.S. financial institutions and eight giant foreign banks – were the
dominant players in global securities and derivatives markets during the credit boom.25 Those 18
LCFIs included most of the top underwriters for nonprime MBS, other types of asset-backed
securities (“ABS”) and leveraged buyout (“LBO”) loans, as well as related collateralized debt
obligations (“CDOs”) and credit default swaps (“CDS”). Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
funded about a fifth of the nonprime mortgage market between 2003 and 2007, they did so
primarily by purchasing nonprime mortgages and private-label MBS that were originated or
underwritten by LCFIs. LCFIs provided most of the rest of the funding for nonprime home

A recent study explains that “[a] nation‟s financial safety net consists of whatever array of programs it
uses to protect bank depositors and to keep systemically important markets and institutions from breaking
down in difficult circumstances.” The study further points out that, during the current financial crisis,
government agencies in the U.S. and the European Union “exercised a loss-shifting „taxpayer put‟ that
converted most of the losses incurred by insolvent [TBTF] firms into government debt.” Edward J. Kane
et al., Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-and-Unwind Banks in the U.S. and EU Before
and During the Great Recession at 2, 4 (July 1, 2011), Paolo Baffi Center Research Paper No. 2011-95,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884131.
24
Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 977 (quoting Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The Dark Side of
Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis,” 41
Connecticut Law Review 963, 1046 (2009) [hereinafter Wilmarth, “Financial Conglomerates”], available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1403973).
25
During the credit boom that led to the financial crisis, the 18 leading LCFIs in global and U.S. markets
for securities underwriting, securitizations, structured-finance products and over-the-counter derivatives
(the “big eighteen”) included the four largest U.S. banks (BofA, JP Morgan Chase (“Chase”), Citigroup
and Wachovia), the five largest U.S. securities firms (Bear Stearns (“Bear”), Goldman Sachs
(“Goldman”), Lehman Brothers (“Lehman”), Merrill Lynch (“Merrill”) and Morgan Stanley), the largest
U.S. insurance company (AIG), and eight foreign universal banks (Barclays, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse,
Deutsche, HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”), Société Générale and UBS). See Wilmarth, “DoddFrank,” supra note 5, at 966 n.45.
23
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mortgages, as well as much of the financing for risky credit card loans, commercial real estate
(“CRE”) loans and LBO loans.26
I have estimated that LCFIs were responsible for financing about $9 trillion of risky
private-sector debt that was outstanding in U.S. financial markets in 2007 in the form of
nonprime home mortgages, credit card loans, CRE loans, LBO loans and junk bonds. Even
worse, LCFIs underwrote some $25 trillion of structured-finance securities and derivatives
whose value depended on the performance of that risky debt, including MBS, ABS, cash flow
CDOs, synthetic CDOs and CDS. Thus, LCFIs created “an invested pyramid of risk,” which
allowed investors to place “multiple layers of financial bets” on the performance of high-risk
loans in securitized pools. Consequently, when the underlying loans began to default, the
leverage inherent in this “pyramid of risk” produced losses that were much larger than the face
amounts of the defaulted loans.27
The central role of LCFIs in the financial crisis is confirmed by the enormous losses they
suffered and the huge bailouts they received. The “big eighteen” LCFIs accounted for threefifths of the $1.5 trillion of total worldwide losses recorded by banks, securities firms and
insurers between the outbreak of the financial crisis in mid-2007 and the spring of 2010.28 The
list of leading LCFIs is “a who‟s who of the current financial crisis” that includes “[m]any of the
Id. at 977-78; see also Phil Angelides, “Fannie, Freddie and the Financial Crisis,” Bloomberg.com,
Aug. 3, 2011 (summarizing report prepared by the staff of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(“FCIC”), and stating that Fannie and Freddie were “disasters” but not the “primary cause of the crisis”
because (i) the GSEs “purchased the highest-rated portions of „private label‟ mortgage securities
produced by Wall Street,” (ii) “[w]hile such purchases added helium to the housing balloon, they
represented just 10.5 percent of „private-label‟ subprime-mortgage-backed securities in 2001, then rose to
40 percent in 2004, and fell back to 28 percent in 2008,” (iii) “[p]rivate investors gobbled up the lion‟s
share of those securities, including the riskier portions,” and (iv) “data compiled by the FCIC for a subset
of borrowers with [credit] scores below 660 shows that by the end of 2008, far fewer GSE mortgages
were seriously delinquent than non-GSE securitized mortgages: 6.2 percent versus 28.3 percent”).
27
Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 966-67; Wilmarth, “Financial Conglomerates,” supra note
24, at 988-96, 1024-41.
28
Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 978.
26

9

firms that either went bust . . . or suffered huge write-downs that led to significant government
intervention.”29 Lehman failed, while two other members of the “big eighteen” LCFIs (AIG and
RBS) were nationalized and three others (Bear, Merrill, and Wachovia) were acquired by other
LCFIs with substantial governmental assistance. Three additional members of the group
(Citigroup, BofA, and UBS) survived only because they received costly government bailouts.30
Chase, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley received substantial infusions of TARP capital, and
Goldman and Morgan Stanley quickly converted to BHCs to secure permanent access to the
FRB‟s discount window as well as “the Fed‟s public promise of protection.”31
Thus, only Lehman failed of the “big eighteen” LCFIs, but the U.S., the U.K. and
European nations provided massive financial assistance to ensure the survival of at least twelve
other members of the group.32 Studies have shown that the TARP capital infusions and FDIC
debt guarantees announced in October 2008 represented very large transfers of wealth from
taxpayers to the shareholders and creditors of the largest U.S. LCFIs.33 In addition, a recent

29

Id. (quoting study by Dwight Jaffee).
Id.; Wilmarth, “Financial Conglomerates,” supra note 24, at 1044-45 (explaining that Citigroup and
BofA “received huge bailout packages from the U.S. government that included $90 billion of capital
infusions and more than $400 billion of asset price guarantees,” while UBS “received a $60 billion
bailout package from the Swiss government”).
31
David Wessel, In Fed We Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic 217–18, 227, 236–40 (2009)
(noting that Chase received $25 billion of TARP capital while Goldman and Morgan Stanley each
received $10 billion); see also Ivry, Keoun & Kuntz, supra note 2 (stating that BofA‟s acquisition of
Merrill Lynch was supported by more than $60 billion of Fed emergency credit, while Wells Fargo‟s
takeover of Wachovia was helped by $50 billion of Fed emergency credit and Chase‟s acquisition of Bear
was assisted by $30 billion of Fed emergency credit).
32
Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 978-79.
33
Elijah Brewer III & Anne Marie Klingenhagen, “Be Careful What You Wish for: The Stock Market
Reactions to Bailing Out Large Financial Institutions,” 18 Journal of Financial Regulation and
Compliance 56, 57–59, 64–66 (2010) (finding significant increases in stock market valuations for the 25
largest U.S. banks as a result of Treasury Secretary Paulson‟s announcement, on Oct. 14, 2008, of $250
billion of TARP capital infusions into the banking system, including $125 billion for the nine largest
banks); Pietro Veronesi & Luigi Zingales, “Paulson‟s Gift,” 97 Journal of Financial Economics 339, 34041, 364 (2010) (concluding that the TARP capital infusions and FDIC debt guarantees announced in
October 2008 produced $130 billion of gains for holders of equity and debt securities of the nine largest
U.S. banks, at an estimated cost to taxpayers of $21 to $44 billion); Eric de Bodt et al., The Paulson
30
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study concluded that the “below-market rates” charged by the Fed on its emergency credit
programs produced $13 billion of profits for the banks that participated in those programs,
including $4.8 billion of earnings for the six largest U.S. banks.34
Given the major advantages conferred by TBTF status, it is not surprising that LCFIs
have pursued aggressive growth strategies during the past two decades to reach a size at which
they would be considered TBTF. All of today‟s four largest U.S. banks (Chase, BofA, Citigroup
and Wells Fargo) are the products of serial acquisitions and explosive growth since 1990.
BofA‟s and Citigroup‟s rapid expansions led them to brink of failure, from which they were
saved by huge federal bailouts. Wachovia (the fourth-largest U.S. bank at the beginning of the
financial crisis) pursued a similar path of frenetic growth until it collapsed in 2008 and was
rescued by Wells Fargo in a federally-assisted merger. A comparable pattern of rapid expansion,
collapse and bailout occurred among RBS, UBS and other European LCFIs.35
By helping major banks to acquire troubled LCFIs, U.S. regulators have produced
domestic financial markets in which the largest banks enjoy an unhealthy dominance. In 2009,
the four largest U.S. banks (BofA, Chase, Citigroup and Wells Fargo) controlled 56% of
domestic banking assets, up from 35% in 2000, while the top ten U.S. banks controlled 75% of
domestic banking assets, up from 54% in 2000. The four largest banks also controlled a majority
Plan‟s Competitive Effects (May 2011), at 2-4, 15-21 (finding that TARP capital infusions between
October 2008 and December 2009 produced significant gains for shareholders of the largest banks but
imposed losses on shareholders of smaller banks by injuring the competitiveness of those banks);
Congressional Oversight Panel, February Oversight Report: Valuing Treasury’s Acquisitions (Feb. 6,
2009), at 4-8, 26-29, 36-38 (presenting a valuation study concluding that (i) TARP capital infusions into
eight major banks (BofA, Citigroup, Chase, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, US Bancorp and Wells Fargo)
provided an average subsidy to those banks equal to 22% of the Treasury‟s investment, and (ii) additional
capital infusions into AIG and Citigroup under TARP provided an average subsidy to those institutions
equal to 59% of the Treasury‟s investment), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-020609report.pdf.
34
Ivry, Keoun & Kuntz, supra note 2 (reporting that “[d]uring the crisis, Fed loans were among the
cheapest around, with funding available for as low as 0.01 percent in December 2008”).
35
Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 984-85; Wilmarth, “Reforming Financial Regulation,” supra
note 1, at 746 n.153.
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of the product markets for home mortgages, home equity loans, and credit card loans. The same
four banks and Goldman accounted for 97% of the aggregate notional values of OTC derivatives
contracts written by U.S. banks.36
The combined assets of the six largest banks – the foregoing five institutions plus Morgan
Stanley – were equal to 63% of U.S. GDP in 2009, compared with only 17% of GDP in 1995.37
Nomi Prins has observed that, as a result of the financial crisis, “we have larger players who are
more powerful, who are more dependent on government capital and who are harder to regulate
than they were to begin with.”38 Similarly, Simon Johnson and James Kwak maintain that “the
problem at the heart of the financial system [is] the enormous growth of top-tier financial
institutions and the corresponding increase in their economic and political power.”39
3.

The Dodd-Frank Act Does Not Solve the TBTF Problem
In two articles written in 2002 and 2009, I warned that “the TBTF policy is the great

unresolved problem of bank supervision” because it “undermines the effectiveness of both
supervisory and market discipline.”40 As I pointed out in both articles, Congress‟ decision to
enact the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) and repeal the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999
authorized the creation of large financial conglomerates that spanned the entire range of our
Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 985.
Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial
Meltdown 202-03, 217 (2010); Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, “Shooting Banks,” New Republic, Mar.
11, 2010, at 20. See also Thomas M. Hoenig, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, “It‟s Not
Over „Til It‟s Over: Leadership and Financial Regulation” (William Taylor Memorial Lecture, Oct. 10,
2010) (noting that “the largest five [U.S. BHCs] control $8.4 trillion of assets, nearly 60 percent of GDP,
and the largest 20 control $12.8 trillion of assets or almost 90 percent of GDP”), available at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/speechbio/hoenigpdf/william-taylor-hoenig-10-10-10.pdf; Ivry, Keoun &
Kuntz, supra note 2 (reporting that “[t]otal assets held by the six biggest U.S. banks increased 39 percent
to $9.5 trillion on Sept. 30, 2011, from $6.8 trillion on the same day in 2006”).
38
Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 985-86 (quoting Ms. Prins).
39
Johnson & Kwak, supra note 37, at 191.
40
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry: Competition,
Consolidation, and Increased Risks,” 2002 University of Illinois Law Review 215, 475 [hereinafter
Wilmarth, “Transformation”], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=315345; see also Wilmarth,
“Financial Conglomerates, supra note 24, at 1049.
36
37
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financial markets. I warned that the emergence of these new financial giants would bring “major
segments of the securities and life insurance industries . . . within the scope of the TBTF
doctrine, thereby expanding the scope and cost of federal „safety net‟ subsidies.” I also warned
that big financial conglomerates would take advantage of their new powers under GLBA and
their presumed TBTF status by pursuing risky activities involving complex securities and
derivatives, and by increasing their leverage through “capital arbitrage.”41 As I pointed out in
2009:
Unfortunately, the [current] financial crisis has confirmed all of the
foregoing predictions. Over the past decade, regulators in developed nations
encouraged the expansion of large financial conglomerates and failed to restrain
their pursuit of short-term profits through increased leverage and high-risk
activities. As a result, LCFIs were allowed to promote an enormous credit boom,
and that boom precipitated a worldwide financial crisis. In order to avoid a
complete collapse of global financial markets, central banks and governments
have already provided almost $9 trillion of support . . . for major banks, securities
firms and insurance companies. Those support measures – which are far from
over – establish beyond any doubt that the TBTF policy now embraces the entire
financial services industry.42
The financial crisis has demonstrated that TBTF subsidies create dangerous distortions in
our financial markets and our general economy, and those subsidies must be eliminated (or at
least significantly reduced) in order to restore a more level playing field for smaller financial

Wilmarth, “Transformation,” supra note 40, at 444-476 (quotes at 447, 476); see also Wilmarth,
“Financial Conglomerates,” supra note 24, at 1049.
42
Wilmarth, “Financial Conglomerates,” supra note 24, at 1049-50. In a subsequent article, I described
the unprecedented credit boom that occurred in the U.S. economy between December 31, 1991 and
December 31, 2007:
41

Nominal domestic private-sector debt nearly quadrupled, rising from $10.3 trillion to $39.9
trillion [between 1991 and 2007], and the largest increases occurred in the financial and
household sectors. Total U.S. private-sector debt as a percentage of gross domestic product
(“GDP”) rose from 150 % in 1987 to almost 300 % in 2007 and, by that measure, exceeded even
the huge credit boom that led to the Great Depression. Financial sector debt as a percentage of
GDP rose from 40 % in 1988 to 70 % in 1998 and 120 percent in 2008. Meanwhile, household
sector debt grew from two-thirds of GDP in the early 1990s to 100 % of GDP in 2008.
Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 970.
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institutions and to encourage the voluntary breakup of inefficient and risky financial
conglomerates.43 The financial crisis has also proven, beyond any reasonable doubt, that large
financial conglomerates operate based on a hazardous business model that is riddled with
conflicts of interest and prone to speculative risk-taking.44 Accordingly, U.S. and European
governments must adopt reforms to ensure that effective supervisory and market discipline is
applied against LCFIs,
A few months before Dodd-Frank was enacted, I wrote an article proposing five key
reforms to accomplish these objectives. My proposed reforms would have (1) strengthened
existing statutory restrictions on the growth of LCFIs, (2) created a special resolution process to
manage the orderly liquidation or restructuring of systemically important financial institutions
(“SIFIs”), (3) established a consolidated supervisory regime and enhanced capital requirements
for SIFIs, (4) created a special insurance fund to cover the costs of resolving failed SIFIs, and (5)
rigorously insulated FDIC-insured banks that are owned by LCFIs from the activities and risks of
their nonbank affiliates.45
The following sections of my testimony discuss my proposed reforms and compare those
proposals to relevant provisions of Dodd-Frank. As shown below, Dodd-Frank includes a portion
of my first proposal as well as the major components of my second and third proposals.
However, Dodd-Frank omits most of my last two proposals. In my opinion, Dodd-Frank‟s
omissions are highly significant and raise serious doubts about the statute‟s ability to prevent
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TBTF bailouts in the future. As explained below, a careful reading of Dodd-Frank indicates that
Congress has left the door open for taxpayer-funded protection of creditors of SIFIs during future
financial crises.
a. Dodd-Frank Modestly Strengthened Existing Statutory Limits on the Growth of
LCFIs But Did Not Close Significant Loopholes
Congress authorized nationwide banking – via interstate branching and interstate
acquisitions of banks by BHCs – when it passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Act of 1994 (“Riegle-Neal Act”).46 To prevent the emergence of dominant
megabanks, the Riegle-Neal Act imposed nationwide and statewide deposit concentration limits
(“deposit caps”) on interstate expansion by large banking organizations.47 Under the RiegleNeal Act, a BHC may not acquire a bank in another state, and a bank may not merge with
another bank across state lines, if the resulting banking organization (together with all affiliated
FDIC-insured depository institutions) would hold (i) 10% or more of the total deposits of all
depository institutions in the U.S., or (ii) 30% or more of the total deposits of all depository
institutions in a single state.48
Unfortunately, Riegle-Neal‟s nationwide and statewide deposit caps contained three
major loopholes. First, the deposit caps applied only to interstate bank acquisitions and interstate
bank mergers, and the deposit caps therefore did not restrict combinations between banking
organizations headquartered in the same state. Second, the deposit caps did not apply to
acquisitions of, or mergers with, thrift institutions and industrial banks, because those institutions
were not treated as “banks” under the Riegle-Neal Act. Third, the deposit caps did not apply to
46

Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338, Sept. 29, 1994.
See House Report No. 103-448, at 65–66 (1994) (additional views of Rep. Neal and Rep. McCollum)
(explaining that the Riegle-Neal Act “adds two new concentration limits to address concerns about
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acquisitions of, or mergers with, banks that are “in default or in danger of default” (the “failing
bank” exception).49
The emergency acquisitions of Countrywide, Merrill, WaMu and Wachovia in 2008
demonstrated the significance of Riegle-Neal‟s loopholes and the necessity of closing them. In
reliance on the “non-bank” loophole, the FRB allowed BofA to acquire Countrywide and Merrill
even though (i) both firms controlled FDIC-insured depository institutions (a thrift, in the case of
Countrywide, and a thrift and industrial bank, in the case of Merrill), and (ii) both transactions
allowed BofA to exceed the 10% nationwide deposit cap. Similarly, after the FDIC seized
control of WaMu as a failed depository institution, the FDIC sold the giant thrift to Chase even
though the transaction enabled Chase to exceed the 10% nationwide deposit cap. Finally,
although the FRB determined that Wells Fargo‟s acquisition of Wachovia gave Wells Fargo
control of just under 10% of nationwide deposits, the FRB probably could have approved the
acquisition in any case by designating Wachovia as a bank “in danger of default.”50
As a result of the foregoing acquisitions, BofA, Chase and Wells Fargo each surpassed
the 10% nationwide deposit cap by October 2008. To prevent further breaches of the Riegle-Neal
concentration limits, I proposed that Congress should extend the nationwide and statewide
deposit caps to cover all intrastate and interstate transactions involving any type of FDIC-insured
depository institution, including thrifts and industrial banks. In addition, I proposed that
Congress should significantly narrow the failing bank exception by requiring federal regulators
to make a “systemic risk determination” (“SRD”) in order to approve any acquisition involving a
failing depository institution that would exceed either the nationwide or statewide deposit caps.51
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Under my proposed standard for an SRD, the FRB and the FDIC could not invoke the
failing bank exception unless they determined jointly, with the concurrence of the Treasury
Secretary, that the proposed acquisition was necessary to avoid a substantial threat of severe
systemic injury to the banking system, the financial markets or the national economy. In
addition, each SRD would be audited by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) to
determine whether regulators satisfied the criteria for an SRD, and would also be reviewed in a
joint hearing held by the House and Senate committees with oversight of the financial markets
(the “SRD Review Procedure”). My proposed SRD requirements would ensure much greater
public transparency of, and scrutiny for, any federal agency order that invokes the failing bank
exception to the Riegle-Neal deposit caps.52
Section 623 of Dodd-Frank does extend Riegle-Neal‟s 10% nationwide deposit cap to
reach all interstate acquisitions and mergers involving any type of FDIC-insured depository
institution. Thus, interstate acquisitions and mergers involving thrift institutions and industrial
banks are now subject to the nationwide deposit cap to the same extent as interstate acquisitions
and mergers involving commercial banks. However, § 623 leaves open the other Riegle-Neal
loopholes because (1) it does not apply the nationwide deposit cap to intrastate acquisitions or
mergers, (2) it does not apply the statewide deposit cap to interstate transactions involving thrifts
or industrial banks or to any type of intrastate transaction, and (3) it does not impose any
enhanced substantive or procedural requirements for invoking the failing bank exception.
Hence, § 623 of Dodd-Frank closes one important loophole but fails to close other significant
exemptions that continue to undermine the effectiveness of Riegle-Neal‟s deposit caps.53
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Section 622 of Dodd-Frank authorizes federal regulators to impose a separate
concentration limit on mergers and acquisitions involving “financial companies.” As defined in
§ 622, the term “financial companies” includes insured depository institutions and their holding
companies, nonbank SIFIs and foreign banks operating in the U.S. Subject to two significant
exceptions described below, § 622 potentially bars any acquisition or merger that would give a
“financial company” control of more than 10% of the total “liabilities” of all financial
companies. This limitation on control of nationwide liabilities (“liabilities cap”) was originally
proposed by former FRB Chairman Paul Volcker.54
The liabilities cap in § 622 provides an additional method for restricting the growth of
very large financial companies (e.g., Citigroup, Goldman, and Morgan Stanley) that rely mainly
on funding from the capital markets instead of deposits.55 However, the liabilities cap has two
significant exceptions. First, it is subject to a “failing bank” exception (similar to the “failing
bank” loophole in Riegle-Neal), which regulators can invoke without making any SRD. Second,
and more importantly, the liabilities cap is not self-executing. Section 622 requires the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) to consider (based on a cost-benefit analysis) whether the
statutory liabilities cap should be modified. Section 622 also requires the FRB to implement the
liabilities cap in accordance with any modifications recommended by FSOC.56
Thus, § 622 allows the FSOC and FRB to weaken (and perhaps even eliminate) the
liabilities cap if they determine that the cap would have adverse effects that outweigh its
potential benefits. Consequently, it is doubtful whether Dodd-Frank will impose any meaningful
new limit on the growth of LCFIs beyond the statute‟s beneficial extension of the nationwide
deposit cap to reach all interstate acquisitions and mergers involving FDIC-insured institutions.
54
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b. Dodd-Frank Establishes a Special Resolution Regime for Systemically Important
Financial Institutions But Allows the FDIC to Provide Full Protection for Favored
Creditors of Those Institutions
i. Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority Does Not Preclude Full
Protection of Favored Creditors of SIFIs
Dodd-Frank establishes an Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”), which seeks to
provide a “viable alternative to the undesirable choice . . . between bankruptcy of a large,
complex financial company that would disrupt markets and damage the economy, and bailout of
such financial company that would expose taxpayers to losses and undermine market
discipline.”57 In some respects, the OLA for SIFIs – which is similar to the FDIC‟s existing
resolution regime for failed depository institutions58 – resembles my earlier proposal for a special
resolution regime for SIFIs.59 However, contrary to the statute‟s stated purpose,60 Dodd-Frank‟s
OLA does not preclude future bailouts for favored creditors of TBTF institutions.
Dodd-Frank establishes FSOC as an umbrella organization with systemic risk oversight
authority. FSOC‟s voting members include the leaders of nine federal financial regulatory
agencies and an independent member having insurance experience. By a two-thirds vote, FSOC
may determine that a domestic or foreign nonbank financial company should be subject to DoddFrank‟s systemic risk regime, which includes prudential supervision by the FRB and potential
liquidation by the FDIC under the OLA. In deciding whether to impose Dodd-Frank‟s systemic
risk regime on a nonbank financial company, the crucial question to be decided by FSOC is
57
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whether “material financial distress at the . . . nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope,
size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the . . . nonbank
financial company, could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.”61
Dodd-Frank does not use the term “systemically important financial institution” to
describe a nonbank financial company that is subject to the statute‟s systemic risk regime, but I
will generally refer to such companies as SIFIs. Dodd-Frank treats BHCs with assets of more
than $50 billion as SIFIs, and those BHCs are also subject to enhanced supervision by the FRB
and potential liquidation by the FDIC under the OLA.62 Dodd-Frank properly recognizes that –
absent mandatory breakups of LCFIs – the best way to impose effective discipline on SIFIs, and
to reduce the federal subsidies they receive, is to designate them publicly as SIFIs and to impose
stringent regulatory requirements that force them to internalize the potential costs of their TBTF
status.63 However, it is noteworthy – and disturbing – that FSOC has not yet publicly designated
any large nonbank financial firm as a SIFI, even though almost 18 months have gone by since
Dodd-Frank‟s enactment.
As I and many others have proposed, Article II of Dodd-Frank establishes a systemic
resolution process – the OLA – to handle the failures of SIFIs.64 In order to invoke the OLA for
a “covered financial company,” the Treasury Secretary must issue an SRD, based on the
recommendation of the FRB together with either the FDIC or the SEC (if the failing company‟s
largest subsidiary is a securities broker or dealer) or the Federal Insurance Office (if the failing
company‟s largest subsidiary is an insurance company). The Treasury Secretary‟s SRD must find
that (i) the covered financial company‟s failure and resolution under otherwise applicable
Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 993-94.
Id. at 994 (discussing §§ 115 and 165 of Dodd-Frank).
63
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insolvency rules (e.g, the federal bankruptcy laws) would have “serious adverse effects on
financial stability,” (ii) application of the OLA would “avoid or mitigate such adverse effects,”
and (iii) “no viable private sector alternative is available to prevent” the company‟s failure.65
I have argued that the systemic resolution process for SIFIs should embody three core
principles in order to create a close similarity between that process and Chapter 11 of the federal
Bankruptcy Code. Those core principles are: (A) requiring equity owners in a failed SIFI to lose
their entire investment if the SIFI‟s assets are insufficient to pay all valid creditor claims, (B)
removing senior managers and other employees who were responsible for the SIFI‟s failure, and
(C) requiring unsecured creditors to accept meaningful “haircuts” in the form of significant
reductions of their debt claims or an exchange of substantial portions of their debt claims for
equity in a successor institution.66
Dodd-Frank incorporates the first two of my core principles. It requires the FDIC to
ensure that equity owners of a failed SIFI do not receive any payment until all creditor claims are
paid, and that managers responsible for the failure are removed. At first sight, Dodd-Frank also
seems to embody the third principle by directing the FDIC to impose losses on unsecured
creditors if a failed SIFI‟s assets are insufficient to pay all secured and unsecured debts.
However, a careful reading of the statute reveals that Dodd-Frank allows the FDIC to provide
full protection to favored classes of unsecured creditors of failed SIFIs.67
In its capacity as receiver for a failed SIFI, the FDIC may provide funds for the payment
or transfer of creditors‟ claims in at least two ways. First, the FDIC may provide funding directly
to the SIFI‟s receivership estate by making loans, purchasing or guaranteeing assets, or assuming
or guaranteeing liabilities. Second, the FDIC may provide funding to establish a “bridge
65
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financial company” (“BFC”), and the FDIC may then approve a transfer of designated assets and
liabilities from the failed SIFI to the BFC. In either case, the FDIC may (i) take steps to
“mitigate[] the potential for serious adverse effects to the financial system,” and (ii) provide
preferential treatment to certain creditors if the FDIC determines that such treatment is necessary
to “maximize” the value of a failed SIFI‟s assets or to preserve “essential” operations of the SIFI
or a successor BFC. Subject to the foregoing conditions, the FDIC may give preferential
treatment to certain creditors as long as every creditor receives at least the amount she would
have recovered in a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7 of the federal Bankruptcy Code. 68
In October 2010, the FDIC issued a proposed rule to implement its authority under the
OLA. In January 2011, the FDIC approved the proposed OLA rule as an interim final rule.69
Under the OLA rule, the FDIC may provide preferential treatment to certain creditors in order
“to continue key operations, services, and transactions that will maximize the value of the [failed
SIFI‟s] assets and avoid a disorderly collapse in the marketplace.”70 The OLA rule excludes the
following classes of creditors from any possibility of preferential treatment: (i) holders of
unsecured senior debt with a term of more than 360 days, and (ii) holders of subordinated debt.
Accordingly, the OLA rule would allow the FDIC to provide full protection to short-term,
unsecured creditors of a failed SIFI whenever the FDIC determines that such protection is
“essential for [the SIFI‟s] continued operation and orderly liquidation.”71
The OLA rule would allow the FDIC to give full protection to short-term liabilities of
SIFIs, including commercial paper and securities repurchase agreements. Those types of
68
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wholesale liabilities proved to be highly volatile and prone to creditor “runs” during the financial
crisis.72 Unfortunately, by stating that the FDIC reserves the right to provide preferential
treatment to short-term creditors of failed SIFIs, but will never provide such treatment to holders
of long-term debt or subordinated debt, the OLA rule is likely have at least two perverse results.
The OLA rule (i) creates the appearance of an implicit subsidy to short-term creditors of SIFIs,
and (ii) encourages SIFIs to rely even more heavily on vulnerable, short-term funding strategies
that led to repeated disasters during the financial crisis.73
As indicated by the OLA rule, Dodd-Frank gives the FDIC considerable leeway to
provide de facto bailouts for favored creditors of failed SIFIs. Dodd-Frank also provides a
funding source for such bailouts. Section 201(n) of Dodd-Frank establishes an Orderly
Liquidation Fund (“OLF”) to finance liquidations of SIFIs. As discussed below, Dodd-Frank
does not establish a pre-funding mechanism for the OLF. However, the FDIC may obtain funds
for the OLF by borrowing from the Treasury in amounts up to (i) 10% of a failed SIFI‟s assets
within thirty days after the FDIC‟s appointment as receiver, plus (ii) 90% of the “fair value” of
the SIFI‟s assets that are “available for repayment” thereafter.”74 The FDIC‟s authority to
borrow from the Treasury provides an immediate source of funding to protect unsecured
creditors that are deemed to have systemic significance. In addition, the “fair value” standard
potentially gives the FDIC considerable discretion in appraising the assets of a failed SIFI, since

See Zoltan Pozsar et al., “Shadow Banking” (Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 458, July
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the standard does not require the FDIC to rely on current market values in measuring the value of
a failed SIFI‟s assets.75
Dodd-Frank generally requires the FDIC to impose a “claw-back” on creditors who
receive preferential treatment if the proceeds of liquidating a failed SIFI are insufficient to repay
the full amount that the FDIC borrows from the Treasury to conduct the liquidation. However,
Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC to exercise its powers under the OLA (including its authority to
provide preferential treatment to favored creditors of a failed SIFI) for the purpose of preserving
“the financial stability of the United States” and preventing “serious adverse effects to the
financial system.”76 Therefore, the FDIC could conceivably assert the power to waive its right of
“claw-back” against a failed SIFI‟s creditors who received preferential treatment if the FDIC
determines that such a waiver is necessary to maintain the stability of the financial markets.77
ii.

Dodd-Frank Does Not Prevent Federal Regulators from Using Other Sources
of Funding to Protect Creditors of SIFIs

Dodd-Frank could potentially be interpreted as allowing the FDIC to borrow an
additional $100 billion from the Treasury for use in accomplishing the orderly liquidation of a
failed SIFI. Dodd-Frank states that the FDIC‟s borrowing authority for the OLF does not
“affect” the FDIC‟s authority to borrow from the Treasury Department under 12 U.S.C. §
1824(a).78 Under §1824(a), the FDIC may exercise its “judgment” to borrow up to $100 billion
from the Treasury “for insurance purposes,” and the term “insurance purposes” appears to
include functions beyond the FDIC‟s responsibility to administer the Deposit Insurance Fund
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(“DIF”) for banks and thrifts.79 Dodd-Frank bars the FDIC from using the DIF to assist the OLF
or from using the OLF to assist the DIF.80 However, the FDIC could conceivably assert that it
has authority to borrow up to $100 billion from the Treasury under § 1824(a) for the “insurance
purpose” of financing an orderly liquidation of a SIFI outside the normal funding parameters of
the OLF. Assuming that such supplemental borrowing authority is available to the FDIC, the
FDIC could use that authority to protect a SIFI‟s uninsured and unsecured creditors as long as
such protection “maximizes” the value of the SIFI‟s assets or “mitigates the potential for serious
adverse effects to the financial system.”81
The “systemic risk exception” (“SRE”) to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”)
provides a further potential source of funding to protect creditors of failed SIFIs.82 Under the
SRE, the Treasury Secretary can authorize the FDIC to provide full protection to uninsured
creditors of a bank in order to avoid or mitigate “serious effects on economic conditions or
financial stability.”83 Dodd-Frank amended and narrowed the SRE by requiring that a bank must
be placed in receivership in order for the bank‟s creditors to receive extraordinary protection
under the SRE.84 Thus, if a failing SIFI owned a bank that was placed in receivership, the SRE
would permit the FDIC (with the Treasury Secretary‟s approval) to provide full protection to
Under § 1824(a), the FDIC may borrow up to $100 billion “for insurance purposes” and such borrowed
funds “shall be used by the [FDIC] solely in carrying out its functions with respect to such insurance.” 12
U.S.C. § 1824(a). Section 1824(a) further provides that the FDIC “may employ any funds obtained under
this section for purposes of the [DIF] and the borrowing shall become a liability of the [DIF] to the extent
funds are employed therefor.” Id. (emphasis added). The foregoing language strongly indicates that
funds borrowed by the FDIC under § 1824(a) do not have to be used exclusively for the DIF and can be
used for other “insurance purposes” in accordance with the “judgment” of the Board of Directors of the
FDIC. It could be argued that borrowing for the purpose of funding the OLF would fall within such
“insurance purposes.”
80
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creditors of that bank in order to avoid or mitigate systemic risk. By protecting a SIFI-owned
bank‟s creditors (which could include the SIFI itself), the FDIC could use the SRE to extend
indirect support to the SIFI‟s creditors.
Two provisions of Dodd-Frank limit the authority of the FRB and the FDIC to provide
financial support to failing SIFIs or their subsidiary banks outside the OLA or the SRE. First,
§1101 of Dodd-Frank provides that the FRB may not extend emergency secured loans under
§13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act85 except to solvent firms that are “participant[s] in any
program or facility with broad-based eligibility” that has been approved by the Treasury
Secretary and reported to Congress.86 Second, § 1105 of Dodd-Frank forbids the FDIC from
guaranteeing debt obligations of depository institutions or their holding companies or other
affiliates except pursuant to a “widely available program” for “solvent” institutions that has been
approved by the Treasury Secretary and endorsed by a joint resolution of Congress. 87
In light of the foregoing constraints, it is difficult to envision how the FRB or the FDIC
could provide loans or debt guarantees to individual failing SIFIs or their subsidiary banks under
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§ 1101 or § 1105 of Dodd-Frank.88 However, the FRB could conceivably use its remaining
authority under § 13(3) to create a “broad-based” program similar to the Primary Dealer Credit
Facility (“PDCF”) in order to provide emergency liquidity assistance to a selected group of
LCFIs that the FRB deems to be “solvent.”89 As shown by the events of 2008, it is extremely
difficult for outsiders (including members of Congress) to second-guess a regulator‟s
determination of solvency in the midst of a systemic crisis. Moreover, regulators are strongly
inclined during a crisis to make generous assessments of solvency in order to justify their
decision to provide emergency assistance to troubled LCFIs.90 Thus, during a financial crisis the
FRB could potentially assert its authority under amended § 13(3) to provide emergency loans to
a targeted group of troubled LCFIs that it claimed to be “solvent.”
Moreover, Dodd-Frank does not limit the ability of individual LCFIs to receive liquidity
support from the FRB‟s discount window or from Federal Home Loan Banks (“FHLBs”). The
FRB‟s discount window (often referred to as the FRB‟s “lender of last resort” facility) provides
short-term loans to depository institutions secured by qualifying collateral. Similarly, FHLBs –
sometimes described as “lender[s] of next-to-last resort” – provide collateralized advances to
member institutions, including banks and insurance companies.91
During the financial crisis, banks did not borrow significant amounts from the discount
window due to (i) the perceived “stigma” of doing so and (ii) the availability of alternative
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sources of credit through FHLBs and several emergency liquidity facilities that the FRB
established under its § 13(3) authority. The FHLBs provided $235 billion of advances to
member institutions during the second half of 2007, following the outbreak of the financial crisis.
During that period, FHLBs extended almost $150 billion of advances to ten major LCFIs. Six of
those LCFIs incurred large losses during the crisis and failed, were acquired in emergency
transactions, or received “exceptional assistance” from the federal government. Accordingly,
FHLB advances provided a significant source of support for troubled LCFIs, especially during
the early phase of the financial crisis. During future crises, it seems likely that individual LCFIs
will use the FRB‟s discount window more frequently, along with FHLB advances, because
Dodd-Frank prevents the FRB from providing emergency credit to individual institutions under §
13(3).92
Discount window loans and FHLB advances cannot be made to banks in receivership,
but they do provide a potential source of funding for troubled SIFIs or SIFI-owned banks as long
as that funding is extended prior to the appointment of a receiver for either the bank or the SIFI.
To the extent that the FRB or FHLBs provide such funding, at least some short-term creditors of
troubled SIFIs or SIFI-owned banks are likely to benefit by obtaining full payment of their
claims before any receivership is created. 93
Thus, notwithstanding Dodd-Frank‟s explicit promise to end bailouts of SIFIs, federal
agencies retain several powers that will permit them to protect creditors of weakened SIFIs. A
more fundamental problem is that Dodd-Frank‟s “no bailout” pledge does not bind future
Congresses. When a future Congress confronts the next systemic financial crisis, that Congress
may well decide to abandon Dodd-Frank‟s “no bailout” position either explicitly (by amending
Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 1004.
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or repealing the statute) or implicitly (by looking the other way while regulators expansively
construe their authority to protect creditors of SIFIs). For example, Congress and President
George H.W. Bush made “never again” statements when they rescued the thrift industry with
taxpayer funds in 1989, but those statements did not prevent Congress and President George W.
Bush from using public funds to bail out major financial institutions in 2008.94 As Adam Levitin
has observed:
Law is an insufficient commitment device for avoiding bailouts altogether. It is
impossible to produce binding commitment to a preset resolution process, irrespective of
the results. The financial Ulysses cannot be bound to the mast. . . . Once the ship is
foundering, we do not want Ulysses to be bound to the mast, lest [we] go down with the
ship and drown. Instead, we want to be sure his hands are free – too bail.95
Similarly, Cheryl Block has concluded that “despite all the . . . „no more taxpayer-funded
bailout‟ clamor included in recent financial reform legislation, bailouts in the future are likely if
circumstances become sufficiently severe.”96 Accordingly, there is a substantial probability that
future Congresses will relax or remove Dodd-Frank‟s constraints on TBTF bailouts, or will
permit federal regulators to evade those limitations, if such actions are deemed necessary to
prevent failures of SIFIs that could destabilize our financial system.97
c. Dodd-Frank Subjects SIFIs to Enhanced Supervisory Standards, But Those
Provisions Are Not Likely to Prevent Future Bailouts of SIFIs
Dodd-Frank provides the FRB with consolidated supervision and enforcement authority
over nonbank SIFIs comparable to the FRB‟s umbrella supervisory and enforcement powers with
respect to BHCs and financial holding companies (“FHCs”). Dodd-Frank also requires the FRB
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(either on its own motion or on FSOC‟s recommendation) to adopt enhanced prudential
standards for nonbank SIFIs and large BHCs “[i]n order to prevent or mitigate risks to the
financial stability of the United States.”98 The enhanced standards must be “more stringent” than
the ordinary supervisory rules that apply to nonbank financial companies and BHCs that are not
SIFIs.99
Dodd-Frank requires the FRB to adopt enhanced risk-based capital requirements,
leverage limits, liquidity requirements, overall risk management rules, risk concentration limits,
requirements for resolution plans (“living wills”) and credit exposure reports. In addition, the
FRB may, in its discretion, require SIFIs to satisfy contingent capital requirements, enhanced
public disclosures, short-term debt limits, and additional prudential standards.100
It may be very difficult for SIFIs to reach agreement with outside investors on terms for
contingent capital that are mutually satisfactory. Institutional investors are not likely to purchase
debt securities that will be compelled to convert into equity stock when an SIFI is in trouble
unless those convertible debt securities offer comparatively high yields and/or other investorfriendly features that may not be attractive to LCFIs.101
Whether or not contingent capital proves to be a feasible option for attracting investment
by outside investors, I believe that contingent capital should become a significant component of
future compensation packages for senior managers and other key employees (e.g., risk managers
and traders) of LCFIs. In contrast to outside investors, senior managers and key employees are
“captive investors” who can be required, as a condition of their continued employment, to accept
convertible subordinated debentures in payment of a significant portion (e.g., one-third) of their
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annual compensation. Managers and key employees should not be allowed to make voluntary
conversions of their subordinated debentures into common stock until the expiration of a
minimum holding period (e.g., three years) after the termination date of their employment. Such
a minimum post-employment holding period would discourage managers and key employees
from taking excessive risks to boost the value of the conversion option during the term of their
employment. At the same time, their debentures should be subject to mandatory conversion into
common stock upon the occurrence of a designated “triggering” event of financial distress.
Requiring managers and key employees to hold a significant portion of contingent capital could
give them positive incentives to manage their LCFI prudently in accordance with the interests of
creditors as well as longer-term shareholders. Such a requirement would also force managers
and key employees to share a significant portion of the loss if their LCFI is threatened with
failure.102
Dodd-Frank‟s provisions requiring consolidated FRB supervision and enhanced
prudential standards for SIFIs represent valuable improvements. For at least five reasons,
however, those provisions are unlikely to prevent future failures of SIFIs with the attendant risk
of governmental bailouts for systemically significant creditors. First, like previous regulatory
reforms, Dodd-Frank relies heavily on the concept of stronger capital requirements.
Unfortunately, capital-based regulation has repeatedly failed in the past.103 As regulators learned
during the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s and early 1990s, capital levels are “lagging
indicators” of bank problems104 because (i) “many assets held by banks . . . are not traded on any
organized market and, therefore, are very difficult for regulators and outside investors to value,”
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and (ii) bank managers “have strong incentives to postpone any recognition of asset depreciation
and capital losses” until their banks have already suffered serious damage.105
Second, LCFIs have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to engage in “regulatory capital
arbitrage” in order to weaken the effectiveness of capital requirements.106 For example, the
Basel II international capital accord was designed to prevent the arbitrage techniques (including
securitization) that banks used to undermine the effectiveness of the Basel I accord.107 However,
many analysts concluded that the Basel II accord (including its heavy reliance on internal riskbased models developed by LCFIs) contained significant flaws and allowed LCFIs to operate
with seriously inadequate capital levels during the period leading up to the financial crisis.108
Third, the past shortcomings of capital-based rules are part of a broader phenomenon of
supervisory failure. Regulators did not stop large banks from pursuing hazardous (and in many
cases fatal) strategies during the 1980s, including rapid growth with heavy concentrations in
high-risk assets and excessive reliance on volatile, short-term liabilities. During the 1980s,
regulators proved to be unwilling or unable to stop risky behavior as long as banks continued to
report profits.109 Similarly, there is wide agreement that federal banking and securities regulators
failed to restrain excessive risk-taking by LCFIs during the two decades leading up to the
financial crisis.110
105
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Fourth, repeated regulatory failures during past financial crises reflect a “political
economy of regulation”111 in which regulators face significant political and practical challenges
that undermine their efforts to discipline LCFIs. A full discussion of those challenges is beyond
the scope of this testimony. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that analysts have
pointed to strong evidence of “capture” of financial regulatory agencies by LCFIs during the two
decades leading up to the financial crisis, due to factors such as (i) large political contributions
made by LCFIs, (ii) an intellectual and policy environment favoring deregulation, and (iii) a
continuous interchange of senior personnel between the largest financial institutions and the top
echelons of the financial regulatory agencies.112 Commentators have also noted that LCFIs
skillfully engaged in global regulatory arbitrage by threatening to move operations from the U.S.
to London or other foreign financial centers if U.S. regulators did not make regulatory
concessions.113
Fifth, Dodd-Frank does not provide specific instructions about the higher capital
requirements and other enhanced prudential standards that the FRB must adopt. Instead, DoddFrank sets forth general categories of supervisory requirements that the FRB either must or may
address. Thus, the actual achievement of stronger prudential standards will depend upon
implementation by the FRB through rulemaking, and LCFIs have marshaled an imposing array
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of lobbying resources to persuade the FRB to adopt more lenient rules.114 When Congress
passed Dodd-Frank, the head of a leading Wall Street trade association declared that “[t]he
bottom line is that this saga will continue,” and he noted that there are “more than 200 items in
[Dodd-Frank]l where final details will be left up to regulators.”115 Domestic and foreign LCFIs
have already succeeded in weakening and delaying the imposition of enhanced capital standards
under the Basel III accord, and they are determined to prevent U.S. regulators from adopting
stronger capital requirements that would go beyond Basel III. 116
For all of the foregoing reasons, as John Coffee has noted, “the intensity of regulatory
supervision is likely to follow a sine curve: tight regulation after a crash, followed by gradual
relaxation thereafter” as the economy improves and the crisis fades in the memories of regulators
and the public.117 When the next economic boom occurs, regulators will face escalating political
pressures to reduce the regulatory burden on LCFIs in order to help those institutions continue to
finance the boom. Accordingly, while Dodd-Frank‟s provisions for stronger supervision and
enhanced prudential standards represent improvements over prior law, they are unlikely to
prevent future failures of SIFIs and the accompanying pressures for governmental protection of
systemically important creditors.118
d. Dodd-Frank Does Not Require SIFIs to Pay Insurance Premiums to Pre-Fund the
Orderly Liquidation Fund
As noted above, Dodd-Frank establishes an Orderly Liquidation Fund (“OLF”) to provide
financing for the FDIC‟s liquidation of failed SIFIs. However, Dodd-Frank does not require
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LCFIs to pay any assessments to pre-fund the OLF. Instead, Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC to
borrow from the Treasury to provide the necessary funding for the OLF after a SIFI is placed in
receivership.119
The FDIC must normally repay any borrowings from the Treasury within five years, but
the Treasury may extend the repayment period in order “to avoid a serious adverse effect on the
financial system of the United States.”120 Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC to repay borrowings
from the Treasury by making ex post assessments on (i) creditors who received preferential
payments (to the extent of such preferences), (ii) nonbank SIFIs supervised by the FRB under
Dodd-Frank, (iii) BHCs with assets of $50 billion or more, and (iii) other financial companies
with assets of $50 billion or more.121
Thus, Dodd-Frank relies on an ex post funding system for financing liquidations of SIFIs.
That was not the case with early versions of the legislation. The financial reform bill passed by
the House of Representatives would have authorized the FDIC to pre-fund the OLF by collecting
up to $150 billion in risk-based assessments from nonbank SIFIs and large BHCs. The bill
reported by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs would also have
established a pre-funded OLF, albeit with a smaller “target size” of $50 billion. FDIC Chairman
Sheila Bair strongly championed the concept of a pre-funded OLF.122
Senate Republicans repeatedly blocked consideration of the financial reform bill on the
Senate floor until Senate Democrats agreed to remove the pre-funding provision. The Obama
Administration never supported the pre-funding mechanism and urged Senate leaders to remove
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it from the bill. During the House-Senate conference committee‟s deliberations on Dodd-Frank,
House Democratic conferees tried to revive the pre-funding mechanism but their efforts failed.123
It is contrary to customary insurance principles to establish an OLF that is funded only
after a SIFI fails and must be liquidated.124 When commentators have considered analogous
insurance issues created by the DIF, they have recognized that moral hazard is reduced when
banks pay risk-based premiums that compel “each bank [to] bear the cost of its own risktaking.”125 No one advocates a post-funded DIF today; indeed, analysts have generally argued
that the DIF needs a higher level of pre-funding in order to respond adequately to systemic
banking crises.126
In stark contrast to the FDI Act – which requires banks to pay deposit insurance
premiums to pre-fund the DIF – Dodd-Frank does not require SIFIs to pay risk-based premiums
to pre-fund the OLF. As a result, SIFIs receive an implicit subsidy and benefit from lower
funding costs due to the protection their creditors expect to receive from the Treasury-backed
OLF. SIFIs will pay nothing for that subsidy until the first SIFI fails.127 Not surprisingly, LCFIs
viewed the removal of pre-funding for the OLF from the Dodd-Frank Act as a significant
“victory,” because it relieved them of the burden of paying an “upfront fee” to cover the
potential costs of their implicit subsidy.128
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The Congressional Budget Office estimated that Dodd-Frank would produce a ten-year
net budget deficit of $19 billion, due primarily to “potential net outlays for the orderly
liquidation of [SIFIs}, measured on an expected value basis.”129 To offset that deficit, the
House-Senate conferees proposed a $19 billion tax on financial companies with assets of $50
billion or more and on hedge funds with managed assets of $10 billion or more. LCFIs strongly
objected to the tax, and Republicans who had voted for the Senate bill threatened to block final
passage of the legislation unless the tax was removed. To ensure Dodd-Frank‟s passage, the
House-Senate conference committee reconvened and removed the $19 billion tax while
substituting other measures that effectively shifted most of the legislation‟s estimated net cost to
taxpayers and midsized banks.130
Thus, LCFIs and their allies were successful in defeating the $19 billion tax as well as the
pre-funded OLF. As I observed in a contemporaneous blog post, “[t]he biggest banks have once
again proven their political clout . . . [and] have also avoided any significant payment for the
subsidies they continue to receive.”131
A pre-funded OLF is essential to shrink TBTF subsidies for LCFIs. The FDIC should
assess risk-adjusted premiums over a period of several years to establish a pre-funded OLF with
financial resources that would provide reasonable protection to taxpayers against the cost of
resolving failures of SIFIs during a future systemic financial crisis. As noted above, federal
regulators provided $290 billion of capital assistance to the 19 largest BHCs – each with assets
of more than $100 billion – and to AIG during the current crisis. Accordingly, $300 billion
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(appropriately adjusted for inflation) would be the minimum acceptable size for a pre-funded
OLF, and OLF premiums should be paid by all BHCs with assets of more than $100 billion (also
adjusted for inflation) and by all designated nonbank SIFIs. The FDIC should impose additional
assessments on SIFIs in order to replenish the OLF within three years after the OLF incurs any
loss due to the failure of a SIFI. 132
There are four essential reasons why Congress should amend Dodd-Frank to require
SIFIs to pay risk-based insurance premiums to pre-fund the OLF. First, it is unlikely that most
SIFIs would have adequate financial resources to pay large OLF assessments after one or more
of their peers failed during a financial crisis. SIFIs are frequently exposed to highly correlated
risk exposures during a serious financial disruption, because they followed similar high-risk
business strategies (“herding”) during the credit boom that led to the crisis. Many SIFIs are
therefore likely to suffer severe losses and to face a substantial risk of failure during a major
disturbance in the financial markets. Consequently, the FDIC (i) probably will not be able in the
short term to collect enough premiums from surviving SIFIs to cover the costs of resolving one
or more failed SIFIs, and (ii) therefore will have to borrow large sums from the Treasury to cover
short-term resolution costs. Even if the FDIC ultimately repays the borrowed funds by imposing
ex post assessments on surviving SIFIs, the public and the financial markets will rightly
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conclude that the federal government (and, ultimately, the taxpayers) provided bridge loans to
pay the creditors of failed SIFIs.133
Second, under Dodd-Frank‟s post-funded OLF, the most reckless SIFIs will effectively
shift the potential costs of their risk-taking to the most prudent SIFIs, because the latter will be
more likely to survive and bear the ex post costs of resolving their failed peers. Thus, a postfunded OLF is undesirable because “firms that fail never pay and the costs are borne by
surviving firms.”134
Third, a pre-funded OLF would encourage each SIFI to monitor other SIFIs and to alert
regulators to excessive risk-taking by those institutions. Every SIFI would know that the failure
of another SIFI would deplete the OLF and would also trigger future assessments that it and
other surviving SIFIs would have to pay. Thus, each SIFI would have good reason to complain to
regulators if it became aware of unsound practices or conditions at another SIFI.135
Fourth, the payment of risk-based assessments to pre-fund the OLF would reduce TBTF
subsidies for SIFIs by forcing them to internalize more of the “negative externality” (i.e., the
potential public bailout cost) of their activities. A pre-funded OLF would provide a reserve fund,
paid for by SIFIs, which would shield governments and taxpayers from having to incur the
expense of underwriting future resolutions of failed SIFIs.136 Jeffrey Gordon and Christopher
Muller also point out that a pre-funded OLF would reduce the TBTF subsidy by making DoddFrank‟s “liquidation threat more credible.”137 In their view, a pre-funded OLF would encourage
regulators to “impos[e] an FDIC receivership” on a failing SIFI.138 In contrast, Dodd-Frank‟s
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post-funded OLF creates a strong incentive for regulators to grant forbearance in order to avoid
or postpone the politically unpopular step of borrowing from the Treasury to finance a failed
SIFI‟s liquidation.139
To further reduce the potential TBTF subsidy for SIFIs, the OLF should be strictly
separated from the DIF, which insures bank deposits. As discussed above, the “systemic-risk
exception” (“SRE”) in the FDI Act is a potential source of bailout funds for SIFI-owned banks,
and those funds could indirectly support creditors of SIFIs.140 Congress should repeal the SRE
and should designate the OLF as the exclusive source of future funding for all resolutions of
failed SIFIs. By repealing the SRE, Congress would ensure that (i) the FDIC must apply the FDI
Act‟s least-cost test in resolving all future bank failures, (ii) the DIF must be used solely to pay
the claims of bank depositors, and (iii) non-deposit creditors of SIFIs could no longer view the
DIF as a potential source of financial support. By making those changes, Congress would
significantly reduce the implicit TBTF subsidy currently enjoyed by SIFIs.141
e. The Dodd-Frank Act Does Not Prevent Financial Holding Companies from Using
Federal Safety Net Subsidies to Support Risky Nonbanking Activities
Dodd-Frank contains three sections that are intended to prevent the federal “safety net”
for banks142 from being used to support risky nonbanking activities connected to the capital
markets. As discussed below, none of those sections is likely to be effective. The first provision
(the Kanjorski Amendment) is unwieldy and constrained by stringent procedural requirements.
The other two provisions (the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment) are riddled with
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loopholes and have long phase-in periods. In addition, the implementation of all three provisions
is subject to broad regulatory discretion and is therefore likely to be influenced by aggressive
industry lobbying.
(a) The Kanjorski Amendment
Section 121 of Dodd-Frank, the “Kanjorski Amendment,” was originally sponsored by
Representative Paul Kanjorski. Section 121 provides the FRB with potential authority to require
large BHCs (with more than $50 billion of assets) or nonbank SIFIs to divest high-risk
operations. However, the FRB may exercise its divestiture authority under § 121 only if (i) the
BHC or nonbank SIFI “poses a grave threat to the financial stability of the United States” and (ii)
the FRB‟s proposed action is approved by at least two-thirds of FSOC‟s voting members.143
Additionally, the FRB may not exercise its divestiture authority unless it has previously
attempted to “mitigate” the threat posed by the BHC or nonbank SIFI by taking several, less
drastic remedial measures.144 If, and only if, the FRB determines that all of those remedial
measures are “inadequate to mitigate [the] threat,” the FRB may then exercise its residual
authority to “require the company to sell or otherwise transfer assets or off-balance-sheet items
to unaffiliated parties.”145
The FRB‟s divestiture authority under § 121 is thus a last resort, and it is restricted by
numerous procedural requirements (including, most notably, a two-thirds FSOC vote). The
Bank Holding Company Act (“BHC Act”) contains a similar provision, under which the FRB
can force a BHC to divest a nonbank subsidiary that “constitutes a serious risk to the financial
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safety, soundness or stability” of any of the BHC‟s banking subsidiaries.146 The FRB may
exercise its divestiture authority under the BHC Act without the concurrence of any other federal
agency, and the FRB is not required to take any intermediate remedial steps before requiring a
divestiture. However, according to a senior Federal Reserve official, the FRB‟s divestiture
authority under the BHC Act “has never been successfully used for a major banking
organization.”147 In view of the much greater procedural and substantive constraints on the
FRB‟s authority under the Kanjorski Amendment, the prospects for an FRB-ordered breakup of a
SIFI seem remote at best.
(b) The Volcker Rule
Section 619 of Dodd-Frank, the “Volcker Rule,” was originally proposed by former FRB
Chairman Paul Volcker.148 As approved by the Senate Banking Committee, the Volcker Rule
would have generally barred banks and BHCs from (i) sponsoring or investing in hedge funds or
private equity funds and (ii) engaging in proprietary trading – i.e., buying and selling securities,
derivatives and other tradable assets for their own account. Thus, the Volcker Rule sought to
prohibit equity investments and trading activities by banks and BHCs except for “market
making” activities conducted on behalf of clients.149
The Senate committee report explained that the Volcker Rule would prevent banks
“protected by the federal safety net, which have a lower cost of funds, from directing those funds
to high-risk uses.”150 The report endorsed Mr. Volcker‟s view that public policy does not favor
having “public funds – taxpayer funds – protecting and supporting essentially proprietary and
146
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speculative activities.”151 The report further declared that the Volcker Rule was directed at
“limiting the inappropriate transfer of economic subsidies” by banks and “reducing inappropriate
conflicts of interest between [banks] and their affiliates.”152 Thus, the Senate report made clear
that a primary goal of the Volcker Rule was to prevent banks from spreading their federal safety
net subsidies to nonbank affiliates engaged in capital markets activities.
LCFIs vehemently opposed the Volcker Rule as embodied in the Senate committee
bill.153 However, the Volcker Rule – and the financial reform bill as a whole – gained significant
political momentum from two events related to Goldman. First, the SEC filed a lawsuit on April
16, 2010, alleging that Goldman defrauded two institutional purchasers of interests in a CDO that
Goldman structured and marketed. The SEC charged that Goldman did not disclose to the
CDO‟s investors that a large hedge fund, Paulson & Co., helped to select the CDO‟s portfolio of
MBS while intending to short the CDO by purchasing CDS from Goldman. The SEC alleged that
Goldman knew, and did not disclose, that Paulson & Co. had an “economic incentive” to select
MBS that it expected to default within the near-term future. The institutional investors in the
CDO lost more than $1 billion, while Paulson & Co. reaped a corresponding gain. Goldman
subsequently settled the SEC‟s lawsuit by paying restitution and penalties of $550 million.154
Second, on April 27, 2010, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Oversight
interrogated Goldman‟s chairman and several of Goldman‟s other current and former officers
during an eleven-hour hearing. The Subcommittee also released a report charging, based on
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internal Goldman documents, that Goldman aggressively sold nonprime mortgage-backed
investments to clients in late 2006 and 2007 while Goldman was “making huge and profitable
bets against the housing market and acting against the interest of its clients.” The allegations
against Goldman presented in the SEC‟s lawsuit and at the Senate hearing provoked widespread
public outrage and gave a major political boost to the Volcker Rule and the reform legislation as
a whole.155
Nevertheless, large financial institutions continued their aggressive lobbying campaign to
weaken the Volcker rule during the conference committee‟s deliberations on the final terms of
Dodd-Frank. The conference committee accepted a last-minute compromise that significantly
weakened the Volcker Rule and “disappointed” Mr. Volcker.156 The final compromise inserted
exemptions in the Volcker Rule that allow banks and BHCs (i) to invest up to 3% of their Tier 1
capital in hedge funds or private equity funds (as long as a bank‟s investments do not exceed 3%
of the total ownership interests in any single fund), (ii) purchase and sell government securities,
(iii) engage in “risk-mitigating hedging activities,” (iv) make investments through insurance
company affiliates, and (v) make small business investment company investments. The
compromise also delayed the Volcker Rule‟s effective date so that banks and BHCs will have
(A) up to seven years after Dodd-Frank‟s enactment date to bring most of their equity investing
and proprietary trading activities into compliance with the Volcker Rule, and (B) up to twelve
years to bring “illiquid” investments that were in existence on May 1, 2010, into compliance
with the Rule.157
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Probably the most troublesome aspect of the Volcker Rule is that the Rule attempts to
distinguish between prohibited “proprietary trading” and permissible “market making.” The
Rule defines “proprietary trading” as “engaging as a principal for the trading account of the
banking entity,” but the Rule allows “[t]he purchase, sale, acquisition, or disposition of securities
and other instruments . . . on behalf of customers.”158 Distinguishing between proprietary trading
and market making is notoriously difficult,159 and analysts predict that large Wall Street banks
will seek to evade the Volcker Rule by shifting their trading operations into so-called “clientrelated businesses.”160 Moreover, the parameters of “proprietary trading,” “market making” and
other ambiguous terms in the Volcker Rule – including the exemption for “[r]isk-mitigating
hedging activities”161 – are yet to be determined. Those terms will be defined in regulations to
be issued jointly by the federal banking agencies, the CFTC and the SEC.162
Mr. Volcker has urged regulators to adopt “[c]lear and concise definitions [and] firmly
worded prohibitions” to carry out “the basic intent” of § 619.163 However, LCFIs have deployed
formidable political and regulatory influence in pursuit of the opposite result.164 Given the
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Volcker Rule‟s ambiguous terms and numerous exemptions that rely on regulatory
implementation, as well as its long phase-in period, many commentators believe that the Rule
probably will not have a significant impact in restraining risk-taking by major banks or in
preventing them from exploiting their safety net subsidies to fund speculative activities.165
(c) The Lincoln Amendment
Section 726 of Dodd-Frank, the “Lincoln Amendment,” was originally sponsored by
Senator Blanche Lincoln. In April 2010, Senator Lincoln, as chair of the Senate Agriculture
Committee, included the Lincoln Amendment in derivatives reform legislation, which was
passed by the Agriculture Committee and subsequently was combined with the Senate Banking
Committee‟s regulatory reform bill. As adopted by the Agriculture Committee, the Lincoln
Amendment would have barred dealers in swaps and other OTC derivatives from receiving
assistance from the DIF or from the Fed‟s discount window or other emergency lending
facilities.166
Senator Lincoln designed the provision to force major banks to “spin off their derivatives
operations” in order “to prevent a situation in which a bank‟s derivatives deals failed and forced
taxpayers to bail out the institution.”167 The Lincoln Amendment was “also an effort to crack
down on the possibility that banks would use cheaper funding provided by deposits insured by
Cassidy, supra note 156 (stating that “[w]ithout the legislative purity that Volcker was hoping for,
enforcing his rule will be difficult, and will rely on many of the same regulators who did such a poor job
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the FDIC, to subsidize their trading activities.”168 Thus, the purposes of the Lincoln Amendment
– insulating banks from the risks of speculative activities and preventing the spread of safety net
subsidies – were similar to the objectives of the Volcker Rule, but the Lincoln Amendment
focused on dealing and trading in derivatives instead of all types of proprietary trading. 169
The Lincoln Amendment provoked “tremendous pushback . . . from Republicans, fellow
Democrats, the White House, banking regulators, and Wall Street interests.”170 Large banks
claimed that the provision would require them to furnish more than $100 billion of additional
capital to organize separate derivatives trading subsidiaries.171 A prominent industry analyst
opined that the provision “eliminates all of the advantages of the affiliation with an insured
depository institution, which are profound.”172 Those statements reflect a common understanding
that, as discussed below, bank dealers in OTC derivatives enjoy significant competitive
advantages over nonbank dealers due to the banks‟ explicit and implicit safety net subsidies. The
Lincoln Amendment was specifically intended to remove those advantages and to force major
banks to conduct their derivatives trading operations without reliance on federal subsidies.173
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As was true with the Volcker Rule, the House-Senate conference committee agreed to a
final compromise that significantly weakened the Lincoln Amendment.174 As enacted, the
Lincoln Amendment allows an FDIC-insured bank to act as a swaps dealer with regard to (i)
“[h]edging and other similar risk mitigating activities directly related to the [bank‟s] activities,”
(ii) swaps involving interest rates, currency rates and other “reference assets that are permissible
for investment by a national bank,” including gold and silver but not other types of metals,
energy, or agricultural commodities, and (iii) credit default swaps that are cleared pursuant to
Dodd-Frank and carry investment-grade ratings.175 In addition, the Lincoln Amendment allows
banks up to five years to divest or spin off nonconforming derivatives operations into separate
affiliates.176
Analysts estimate that the compromised Lincoln Amendment will require major banks to
spin off only ten to twenty percent of their existing derivatives activities into separate
affiliates.177 In addition, banks will able to argue for retention of derivatives that are used for
“hedging” purposes, an open-ended standard that will require much elaboration by regulators.178
As in the case of the Volcker Rule, commentators concluded that the Lincoln Amendment was
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“greatly diluted,”179 “significantly weakened,”180 and “watered down,”181 with the result that “the
largest banks‟ [derivatives] operations are largely left intact.”182
The requirement that bank must clear their trades of CDS in order to be exempt from the
Lincoln Amendment is potentially significant.183 However, there is no clearing requirement for
other derivatives (e.g., interest and currency rate swaps) that reference assets permissible for
investment by national banks (“bank-eligible” derivatives). Consequently, banks may continue
to trade and deal in OTC derivatives (except for CDS) without restriction under the Lincoln
Amendment if those derivatives are bank-eligible.184 In addition, as discussed above, all
“proprietary trading” by banks in derivatives must comply with the Volcker Rule as
implemented by regulators.
4. Banks Controlled by Financial Holding Companies Should Operate as “Narrow
Banks” so that They Cannot Transfer Their Federal Safety Net Subsidies to Their
Nonbank Affiliates
As explained above, a fundamental purpose of the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln
Amendment is to prevent LCFIs from using federal safety net subsidies to support their
speculative activities in the capital markets. As enacted, however, both provisions have
numerous gaps and exemptions that undermine their stated purpose.
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As shown below, a highly effective way to prevent the spread of federal safety net
subsidies from banks to their affiliates involved in the capital markets would be to create a twotiered structure of bank regulation and deposit insurance. The first tier of “traditional” banking
organizations would provide a relatively broad range of banking-related services, but those
organizations would not be allowed to engage, or affiliate with firms engaged, in securities
underwriting or dealing, insurance underwriting, or derivatives dealing or trading. In contrast,
the second tier of “narrow banks” could affiliate with “nontraditional” financial conglomerates
engaged in capital markets activities (except for private equity investments). However, “narrow
banks” would be prohibited from making any extensions of credit or other transfers of funds to
their nonbank affiliates, except for lawful dividends paid to their parent holding companies. The
“narrow bank” approach provides the most politically feasible approach for ensuring that banks
cannot transfer their safety net subsidies to affiliated companies engaged in speculative activities
in the capital markets, and it is therefore consistent with the objectives of both the Volcker Rule
and the Lincoln Amendment.185
a. The First Tier of Traditional Banking Organizations
Under my proposal, the first tier of regulated banking firms would be “traditional”
banking organizations that limit their activities (including the activities of all holding company
affiliates) to lines of business that satisfy the ”closely related to banking” test under Section
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4(c)(8) of the BHC Act.186 For example, this first tier of traditional banks could take deposits,
make loans, offer fiduciary services, and act as agents in selling securities, mutual funds and
insurance products underwritten by non-affiliated firms. Additionally, they could underwrite and
deal solely in “bank-eligible” securities that national banks are permitted to underwrite and deal
in directly.187 First-tier banking organizations could also purchase, as end-users, derivatives
transactions that (i) hedge against their own firm-specific risks, and (ii) qualify for hedging
treatment under Financial Accounting Standard (“FAS”) Statement No. 133.188
Most first-tier banking firms would probably be small and midsized community-oriented
banks. In the past, those banks typically have not engaged as principal in insurance
underwriting, securities underwriting or dealing, derivatives dealing or trading, or other capital
markets activities. Community banks should be encouraged to continue their primary business
of attracting core deposits, providing “high touch,” relationship-based loans to consumers and to
small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”), and offering wealth management and other
fiduciary services to local customers. (In sharp contrast to traditional community banks, TBTF
megabanks provide impersonal, highly automated lending and deposit programs to SMEs and
consumers, and megabanks also focus on complex, higher-risk transactions in the capital
markets.)189 Traditional, first-tier banks and their holding companies should continue to operate
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under their current supervisory arrangements, and all deposits of first-tier banks (up to the
current statutory maximum of $250,000) should be covered by deposit insurance.
In order to provide reasonable flexibility to first-tier banking organizations, Congress
should amend § 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act by permitting the FRB to expand the list of “closely
related” activities that are permissible for holding company affiliates of traditional banks.190
However, Congress should prohibit first-tier BHCs from engaging as principal in underwriting or
dealing in securities, underwriting any type of insurance (except for credit insurance), dealing or
trading in derivatives, or making private equity investments.
b. The Second Tier of Nontraditional Banking Organizations
Unlike first-tier banking firms, the second tier of “nontraditional” banking organizations
would be allowed to engage, through nonbank subsidiaries, in (i) underwriting and dealing (i.e.,
proprietary trading) in “bank-ineligible” securities,191 (ii) underwriting all types of insurance, and
(iii) dealing and trading in derivatives. Second-tier banking organizations would include: (A)
FHCs registered under §§ 4(k) and 4(l) of the BHC Act,192 (B) holding companies owning
grandfathered “nonbank banks,” and (C) grandfathered “unitary thrift” holding companies.193 In
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addition, firms controlling industrial banks should be required either to register as FHCs or to
divest their ownership of such banks if they cannot comply with the BHC Act‟s prohibition
against commercial activities.194 Second-tier holding companies would thus encompass all of the
largest banking organizations, most of which are heavily engaged in capital markets activities, as
well as other financial conglomerates that control FDIC-insured depository institutions.
i.

Congress Should Require a “Narrow Bank” Structure for
Second-Tier Banks

Under my proposal, FDIC-insured banks that are subsidiaries of second-tier holding
companies would be required to operate as “narrow banks.” The purpose of the narrow bank
structure would be to prevent a “nontraditional” second-tier holding company from transferring
the bank‟s federal safety net subsidies to its nonbank affiliates.
Narrow banks could offer FDIC-insured deposit accounts, including checking and
savings accounts and certificates of deposit. Narrow banks would hold all of their assets in the
form of cash and marketable, short-term debt obligations, including qualifying government
securities, highly-rated commercial paper and other liquid, short-term debt instruments that are
eligible for investment by money market mutual funds (“MMMFs”) under the SEC‟s rules.
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Narrow banks could not hold any other types of loans or investments, nor could they accept any
uninsured deposits. Narrow banks would present a very small risk to the DIF, because (i) each
narrow bank‟s non-cash assets would consist solely of short-term securities that could be
“marked to market” on a daily basis, and the FDIC could therefore readily determine whether a
narrow bank was threatened with insolvency, and (ii) the FDIC could promptly convert a narrow
bank‟s assets into cash if the FDIC decided to liquidate the bank and pay off the claims of its
insured depositors.195
Thus, narrow banks would effectively operate as FDIC-insured MMMFs. To prevent
unfair competition with narrow banks, and to avoid future government bailouts of uninsured
MMMFs, MMMFs should be prohibited from representing, either explicitly or implicitly, that
they will redeem their shares based on a “constant net asset value” (“NAV”) of $1 per share.
Currently, the MMMF industry (which manages about $3 trillion of assets) leads investors to
believe that their funds will be available for withdrawal (redemption) based on “a stable price of
$1 per share.”196 Not surprisingly, “the $1 share price gives investors the false impression that
money-market funds are like [FDIC-insured] banks accounts and can‟t lose money.”197
However, “[t]hat myth was shattered in 2008” when Lehman‟s default on its commercial paper
caused Reserve Primary Fund (a large MMMF that invested heavily in Lehman‟s paper) to suffer
large losses and to “break the buck.”198 Reserve Primary Fund‟s inability to redeem its shares
based on a NAV of $1 per share caused an investor panic that precipitated runs on several
MMMFs. The Treasury Department responded by establishing the Money Market Fund
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Guarantee Program (“MMFGP”), which protected investors in participating MMMFs between
October 2008 and September 2009.199
Critics of MMMFs maintain that the Treasury‟s MMFGP has created an expectation of
similar government bailouts if MMMFs “break the buck” in the future.200 In addition, former
FRB chairman Paul Volcker has argued that MMMFs weaken banks because of their ability to
offer bank-like products without equivalent regulation. MMMFs typically offer accounts with
check-writing features, and they provide returns to investors that are higher than bank checking
accounts because MMMFs do not have to pay FDIC insurance premiums or to comply with other
bank regulations.201 A Group of Thirty report, which Mr. Volcker spearheaded, proposed that
MMMFs that wish to offer bank-like services, such as checking accounts and withdrawals at a
stable NAV of $1 per share, should reorganize as “special-purpose banks” with appropriate
governmental supervision and insurance.202 In contrast, MMMFs that do not wish to operate as
banks should be required to base their redemption price on a floating NAV, so that investors are
not misled into believing that they can always redeem their MMMFs shares at par.203
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If Congress required nonbank MMMFs to base their redemption price on a floating NAV
and also adopted my proposal for a two-tiered structure of bank regulation, many MMMFs
would voluntarily reorganize as FDIC-insured narrow banks and would become subsidiaries of
second-tier FHCs.204 As explained above, rules restricting the assets of narrow banks to
commercial paper, government securities and other types of marketable, highly-liquid
investments would protect the DIF from any significant loss if a narrow bank failed.
ii.

Four Additional Rules Would Prevent Narrow Banks from
Transferring Safety Net Subsidies to Their Affiliates

Congress should adopt four supplemental rules to prevent second-tier holding companies
from exploiting their narrow banks‟ safety net subsidies. First, narrow banks should be
absolutely prohibited – without any possibility of a regulatory waiver – from making any
extensions of credit or other transfers of funds to their affiliates, except for the payment of lawful
dividends out of profits to their parent holding companies.205 Currently, transactions between
FDIC-insured banks and their affiliates are restricted by §§ 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve
Act.206 However, the FRB has repeatedly waived those restrictions during recent financial crises.
The FRB‟s waivers have allowed bank subsidiaries of FHCs to provide extensive support to
affiliated securities broker-dealers and MMMFs. By granting those waivers, the FRB has
enabled banks controlled by FHCs to transfer the safety net subsidy provided by low-cost, FDICinsured deposits to their nonbank affiliates.207
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Dodd-Frank limits the authority of the FRB to grant future waivers or exemptions under
§§ 23A and 23B, because it requires the FRB to obtain the concurrence of either the OCC (with
respect to waivers granted by orders for national banks) or the FDIC (with respect to waivers
granted by orders for state banks or exemptions granted by rulemaking).208 Even so, it is unlikely
that the OCC or the FDIC would refuse to concur with the FRB‟s proposal for a waiver under
conditions of financial stress. Accordingly, Dodd-Frank does not ensure that the restrictions on
affiliate transactions in §§ 23A and 23B will be adhered to in a crisis setting.
For example, the FRB recently permitted BofA to evade the restrictions of § 23A by
transferring an undisclosed amount of derivatives contracts from its Merrill broker-dealer
subsidiary to its subsidiary bank. The transfer materially increased the potential risk to the DIF
and taxpayers from any losses that BofA might incur on those derivatives. However, the transfer
reportedly enabled BofA – which has been struggling with a host of problems – to avoid a
requirement to post $3.3 billion in additional collateral with counterparties, due to the fact that
BofA‟s subsidiary bank enjoys a significantly higher credit rating than Merrill.209 One
commentator noted that “the Fed‟s priorities seem to lie with protecting [BofA] from losses at
Merrill, even if that means greater risks for the FDIC‟s insurance fund.”210
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My proposal for second-tier narrow banks would replace §§ 23A and 23B with an
absolute rule. That rule would completely prohibit any extensions of credit or other transfers of
funds by second-tier banks to their nonbank affiliates (except for lawful dividends paid to parent
holding companies). Under that rule, federal regulators would be barred from approving any
transfers of safety net subsidies by narrow banks to their affiliates. An absolute bar on affiliate
transactions is necessary to prevent FDIC-insured banks from being used as backdoor bailout
devices for nonbank affiliates of LCFIs.
Second, as discussed above, Congress should repeal the “systemic risk exception”
(“SRE”) currently included in the FDI Act. By repealing the SRE, Congress would require the
FDIC to follow the least costly resolution procedure for every failed bank, and the FDIC could
no longer rely on the TBTF policy as a justification for protecting uninsured creditors of a failed
bank or its nonbank affiliates. Repealing the SRE would ensure that the DIF could not be used
to support a bailout of uninsured creditors of a failed or failing SIFI. Removing the SRE from the
FDIA would make clear to the financial markets that the DIF could only be used to protect
depositors of failed banks. Uninsured creditors of SIFIs and their nonbank subsidiaries would
therefore have stronger incentives to monitor the financial operations and condition of such
entities.211
Additionally, a repeal of the SRE would mean that smaller banks would no longer bear
any part of the cost of protecting uninsured creditors of TBTF banks. Under current law, all
FDIC-insured banks must pay a special assessment (allocated in proportion to their total assets)
to reimburse the FDIC for the cost of protecting uninsured claimants of a TBTF bank under the
SRE.212 A 2000 FDIC report noted the unfairness of expecting smaller banks to help pay for
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“systemic risk” bailouts when “it is virtually inconceivable that they would receive similar
treatment if distressed.”213 The FDIC report suggested that the way to correct this inequity is “to
remove the [SRE],”214 as I have proposed here.
Third, second-tier narrow banks should be barred from purchasing derivatives except as
end-users in transactions that qualify for hedging treatment under FAS 133. Thus, my proposal
would require all derivatives dealing and trading activities of second-tier banking organizations
to be conducted through separate nonbank affiliates, in the same manner that GLBA currently
requires all underwriting and dealing in bank-ineligible securities to be conducted through
nonbank affiliates of FHCs.215 Prohibiting second-tier banks from dealing and trading in
derivatives would accomplish an essential goal of the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment,
because it would prevent FHCs from continuing to exploit federal safety net subsidies by
conducting speculative trading activities within their FDIC-insured bank subsidiaries.
BofA‟s recent transfer of derivatives from Merrill to its bank subsidiary demonstrates that
bank dealers in OTC derivatives enjoy significant competitive advantages over nonbank dealers,
due to the banks‟ explicit and implicit safety net subsidies. Banks typically borrow funds at
significantly lower interest rates than their holding company affiliates because (i) banks can
obtain direct, low-cost funding through FDIC-insured deposits, and (ii) banks present lower risks
to their creditors because of their direct access to other federal safety net resources, including (A)
the FRB‟s discount window lending facility, (B) the FRB‟s guarantee of interbank payments
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made on Fedwire, and (C) the greater potential availability of TBTF bailouts for uninsured
creditors of banks (as compared to creditors of BHCs).216
The OCC has confirmed that FHCs generate higher profits when they conduct derivatives
activities directly within their banks, in part because the “favorable [funding] rate enjoyed by the
banks” is lower than “the borrowing rate of their holding companies.”217 Such an outcome may
be favorable to FHCs, but it is certainly not beneficial to the DIF and taxpayers. The DIF and
taxpayers are exposed to a significantly higher risk of losses when derivatives dealing and
trading activities are conducted directly within banks instead of within nonbank holding
company affiliates. Congress must terminate this artificial, federally-subsidized advantage for
bank derivatives dealers.218
Fourth, Congress should prohibit all private equity investments by second-tier banks and
their holding company affiliates. To accomplish this reform – which would be consistent with
the Volcker Rule as originally proposed – Congress should repeal Sections 4(k)(4)(H) and (I) of
the BHC Act,219 which allow FHCs to make merchant banking investments and insurance
company portfolio investments.220 Private equity investments involve a high degree of risk and
have inflicted significant losses on FHCs in the past.221 In addition, private equity investments
threaten to “weaken the separation of banking and commerce” by allowing FHCs “to maintain
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long-term control over entities that conduct commercial (i.e., nonfinancial) businesses.”222 Such
affiliations between banks and commercial firms are undesirable because they are likely to create
serious competitive and economic distortions, including the spread of federal safety net benefits
to the commercial sector of our economy.223
In combination, the four supplemental rules described above would help to ensure that
narrow banks cannot transfer their federal safety net subsidies to their nonbank affiliates.
Restricting the scope of safety net subsidies is of utmost importance in order to restore a more
level playing field between small and large banks, and between banking and nonbanking firms.
Safety net subsidies have increasingly distorted our regulatory and economic policies over the
past three decades. During that period, nonbanking firms have pursued every available avenue to
acquire FDIC-insured depository institutions so that they can secure the funding advantages
provided by low-cost, FDIC-insured deposits. At the same time, nonbank affiliates of banks
have made every effort to exploit the funding advantages and other safety net benefits conferred
by their affiliation with FDIC-insured institutions.224
The most practicable way to prevent the spread of federal safety net subsidies – as well as
their distorting effects on regulation and economic activity – is to establish strong barriers that
prohibit narrow banks from transferring their subsidies to their nonbanking affiliates, including
those engaged in speculative capital markets activities. The narrow bank structure and the
supplemental rules described above would force financial conglomerates to prove that they can
produce superior risk-related returns to investors without relying on explicit and implicit
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government subsidies. Economic studies have failed to confirm the existence of favorable
economies of scale or scope in giant financial conglomerates, and those conglomerates have not
been able to generate consistently positive returns, even under the current regulatory system that
allows them to capture extensive federal subsidies.225
In late 2009, a prominent bank analyst suggested that if Congress prevented nonbank
subsidiaries of FHCs from relying on low-cost deposit funding provided by their affiliated banks,
large FHCs would not be economically viable and would be forced to break up voluntarily.226
Many of the largest commercial and industrial conglomerates in the U.S. and Europe have been
broken up through hostile takeovers and voluntary divestitures during the past three decades
because they proved to be “less efficient and less profitable than companies pursuing more
focused business strategies.”227 It is long past time for financial conglomerates to be stripped of
their safety net subsidies and their presumptive access to TBTF bailouts so that they will be
subject to the same type of scrutiny and discipline that the capital markets have applied to
commercial and industrial conglomerates during the past thirty years. The narrow bank concept
provides a workable plan to impose such scrutiny and discipline on FHCs.
c. Responses to Critiques of the Narrow Bank Proposal
Critics have raised three major objections to the narrow bank concept. First, critics point
out that the asset restrictions imposed on narrow banks would prevent them from acting as

Wilmarth, “Reforming Financial Regulation,” supra note 1, at 748-49; see also Johnson & Kwak,
supra note 37, at 212-13.
226
Karen Shaw Petrou, the managing partner of Federal Financial Analytics, explained that
“[i]nteraffiliate restrictions would limit the use of bank deposits on nonbanking activities,” and “[y]ou
don‟t own a bank because you like branches, you own a bank because you want cheap core funding.” Ms.
Petrou therefore concluded that an imposition of stringent limits on affiliate transactions, “really strikes at
the heart of a diversified banking organization” and “I think you would see most of the very large banking
organizations pull themselves apart” if Congress passed such legislation. Stacy Kaper, “Big Banks Face
Most Pain Under House Bill,” American Banker, Dec. 2, 2009, at 1 (quoting Ms. Petrou).
227
Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank,” supra note 5, at 1047.
225

62

intermediaries of funds between depositors and most borrowers. Many narrow bank proposals
(including mine) would require narrow banks to invest their deposits in safe, highly marketable
assets such as those permitted for MMMFs. Narrow banks would therefore be largely or entirely
barred from making commercial loans. As a result, critics warn that a banking system composed
exclusively of narrow banks could not provide credit to small and midsized business firms that
lack access to the capital markets and depend on banks as their primary source of outside
credit.228
However, my two-tiered proposal would greatly reduce any disruption of the traditional
role of banks in acting as intermediaries between depositors and bank-dependent firms, because
my proposal would allow first-tier “traditional” banks (primarily community-oriented banks) to
continue making commercial loans that are funded by deposits. Community banks make most of
their commercial loans in the form of longer-term “relationship” loans to SMEs. Under my
proposal, community banks could continue to carry on their deposit-taking and lending activities
as first-tier banking organizations without any change from current law, and their primary
commercial lending customers would continue to be smaller, bank-dependent firms.229
In contrast to community banks, big banks do not make a substantial amount of
relationship loans to small firms. Instead, big banks primarily make loans to large and wellestablished firms, and they provide credit to small businesses mainly through highly automated
programs that use impersonal credit scoring techniques. Under my proposal, as indicated above,
most large banks would operate as subsidiaries of second-tier “nontraditional” banking
organizations. Second-tier holding companies would conduct their business lending programs
through nonbank finance subsidiaries that are funded by commercial paper and other debt
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instruments sold to investors in the capital markets. This operational structure should not create
a substantial disincentive for the highly automated small business lending programs offered by
big banks, because most loans produced by those programs (e.g., business credit card loans) can
be financed by the capital markets through securitization.230
Thus, my two-tier proposal should not cause a significant reduction in bank loans to
bank-dependent firms, because big banks have already moved away from traditional
relationship-based lending funded by deposits. If Congress wanted to give LCFIs a strong
incentive to make relationship loans to small and midsized firms, Congress could authorize
second-tier banks to devote a specified percentage (e.g., ten percent) of their assets to such loans,
as long as the banks held the loans on their balance sheets and did not securitize them. By
authorizing such a limited “basket” of relationship loans, Congress could allow second-tier banks
to use deposits to fund those loans without exposing the banks to a significant risk of failure,
since the remainder of their assets would be highly liquid and marketable.
The second major criticism of the narrow bank proposal is that it would lack credibility
because regulators would retain the inherent authority (whether explicit or implicit) to organize
bailouts of major financial firms during periods of severe economic distress. Accordingly, some
critics maintain that the narrow bank concept would simply shift the TBTF problem from insured
banks to their nonbank affiliates.231 However, the force of this objection has been weakened by
the systemic risk oversight and resolution regime established by Dodd-Frank. Under DoddFrank, LCFIs that might have been considered for TBTF bailouts in the past will be designated
and regulated as SIFIs and will also be subject to resolution under Dodd-Frank‟s OLA. As
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shown above, the potential for TBTF bailouts of SIFIs would be reduced further if (i) Congress
required all SIFIs to pay risk-based premiums to pre-fund the OLF, so that the OLF would have
the necessary resources to handle future resolutions of failed SIFIs, and (ii) Congress repealed
the SRE so that the DIF would no longer be available as a potential bailout fund for TBTF
institutions.
Thus, if my proposed reforms were fully implemented, (i) the narrow bank structure
would prevent SIFI-owned banks from transferring their safety net subsidies to their nonbank
affiliates, and (ii) the systemic risk oversight and resolution regime would require SIFIs to
internalize the potential risks that their operations present to financial and economic stability. In
combination, both sets of regulatory reforms would greatly reduce the TBTF subsidies that might
otherwise be available to large financial conglomerates. Moreover, the narrow bank structure
would advance the purpose of “living wills” (resolution plans) by making it much easier for
regulators to separate banks owned by failed SIFIs from their nonbank affiliates. As discussed
above, narrow banks would not be allowed to become entangled with their nonbank affiliates
through extensions of credit and other transfers of funds.232
The third principal objection to the narrow bank proposal is that it would place U.S.
FHCs at a significant disadvantage in competing with foreign universal banks that are not
required to comply with similar constraints.233 Again, there are persuasive rebuttals to this
objection. For example, the U.K. Independent Commission on Banking recently issued a report
(the “Vickers Report”) that presents a reform program analogous to my proposal. The Vickers
Report has proposed a regime that would force large financial conglomerates to adopt a “ringfenced” structure that would separate their retail “utility” banking operations – including
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financial services provided to consumers and SMEs – from their wholesale “casino” activities in
the financial markets.234 U.K. analysts noted that the Vickers plan would require financial
conglomerates to “build firewalls between their consumer units and investment banks” and likely
cause “a jump in the cost of funding for their investment-banking divisions as the implicit [U.K.]
government guarantee is removed.”235 The Cameron government has pledged to implement the
recommendations of the Vickers Report by the end of the current Parliamentary session in
2015.236
If the U.S. and the U.K. both decide to implement a narrow banking structure
(supplemented by strong systemic risk oversight and resolution regimes), their combined
leadership in global financial markets would (i) eliminate claims by global SIFIs that they would
face an unlevel playing field if they competing in both the New York and London financial
markets, and (ii) place considerable pressure on other major global financial centers to adopt
similar financial reforms.237 The financial sector accounts for a large share of the domestic
economies of the U.S. and U.K. Both economies were severely damaged by two financial crises
during the past decade (the dotcom-telecom bust and the subprime lending crisis). Both crises
were produced by the same set of LCFIs that continue to dominate the financial systems in both
nations. Accordingly, regardless of what other nations may do, the U.S. and the U.K. have
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compelling national reasons to make sweeping changes to their financial systems in order to
protect their domestic economies from the threat of a similar crisis in the future.238
The view that the U.S. and the U.K. must refrain from implementing fundamental
financial reforms until all other major developed nations have agreed to do so rests upon two
deeply flawed assumptions: (i) the U.S. and the U.K. should allow foreign nations with the
weakest systems of financial regulation to dictate the level of supervisory constraints on LCFIs,
and (ii) until a comprehensive international agreement on reform is achieved, the U.S. and the
U.K. should continue to provide TBTF bailouts and other safety net subsidies that impose huge
costs, create moral hazard and distort economic incentives simply because other nations provide
similar benefits to their LCFIs.239 Both assumptions are unacceptable and must be rejected.
d. The Relevance of the Schumer “Core Banking” Proposal of 1991
In 1991, Congress considered, but did not pass, legislation proposed by the Treasury
Department to allow banks to affiliate with securities firms and insurance companies by
organizing financial holding companies. During the House debates on the 1991 legislation,
which was essentially a forerunner of GLBA,240 then-Representative Charles Schumer offered an
amendment that incorporated a narrow banking proposal similar to the one I have presented in
this testimony.241 Representative Schumer argued that Congress should not authorize financial
holding companies unless it adopted his amendment, which he described as a “core bank
proposal.”242 His proposal sought to guarantee that “insured deposits [are] used for low-risk,
traditional banking activities, and then if our large financial institutions wish to invest in high-
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risk activities, they do not use the depositors‟ money, they do not use insured dollars, but they go
to the markets for money.”243
Representative Schumer maintained that the FDIC and taxpayers should not be insuring
such risky activities as “huge bridge loans to LBO‟s, . . . equity investments in real estate[,] . . .
foreign currency trading and trading in . . . , derivatives, which is betting on futures.”244 He
noted that “[m]ost of the large banks are opposed because they do not want to take the necessary
medicine to make them better,” but he argued that “[t]hey need strong medicine, and only core
banking provides it.”245 Representative Marge Roukema supported the proposal because “the
core bank concept is the only proposal before us to insulate the deposit insurance fund and
protect the taxpayer from future bailouts.”246 She agreed that “insured deposits should only be
used to finance [the] traditional business of banking” and should not be used to “finance highly
speculative lending, equity investments or other activities which should be done outside the
Federal safety net.”247
Representative Schumer‟s core banking proposal was defeated.248 However, he was
undoubtedly correct in saying that his proposal was the “only amendment on the floor today that
says we will not do what we did during the S&L crisis, and that is [to] use insured dollars for
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risky activities.”249 He argued that Congress had grievously erred in 1982, when it allowed
federal thrifts to “expand into new businesses with the taxpayers‟ dollars.”250 He further warned
that Congress would be confronted with a future bailout of the banking system that could cost
“$300 billion”
unless we reform the system today. Do not put it off. Do not delay. The
taxpayers cannot afford it. Only [the] core bank [proposal] will protect the
insured deposit system once and for all.251
Unfortunately, Representative Schumer‟s warning not only proved to be prescient but
also underestimated the potential cost of allowing banks to expand into capital markets activities
while relying on federal safety net subsidies. As the current financial crisis has made clear,
Congress must mandate narrow banking in order to prevent FDIC-insured banks from being used
to subsidize similar high-risk underwriting, trading and investment activities in the future.
CONCLUSION
Dodd-Frank makes meaningful improvements in the regulation of large financial
conglomerates. Dodd-Frank establishes a new umbrella oversight body – the FSOC – that will
designate nonbank SIFIs and make recommendations for the supervision of those institutions and
large BHCs. Dodd-Frank also empowers the FRB to adopt stronger capital requirements and
other enhanced prudential standards for both types of SIFIs. Most importantly, Dodd-Frank
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establishes a new systemic resolution regime – the OLA – that should provide a superior
alternative to the “bailout or bankruptcy” choice that federal regulators confronted when they
dealt with failing SIFIs during the financial crisis. However, the OLA‟s feasibility remains
unproven with regard to global SIFIs that operate across multiple national borders, since most
foreign countries do not have resolution procedures that are congruent with the OLA.252
In addition, as explained above, the OLA does not completely shut the door to future
government rescues for creditors of SIFIs. The FRB can still provide emergency liquidity
assistance to troubled LCFIs through the discount window and (perhaps) through “broad-based”
liquidity facilities like the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, which are designed to help targeted
groups of the largest financial institutions. FHLBs can still make advances to LCFIs. The FDIC
can potentially use its Treasury borrowing authority and the SRE to protect uninsured creditors
of failed SIFIs and their subsidiary banks. While Dodd-Frank has undoubtedly made TBTF
bailouts more difficult, the continued existence of these avenues for financial assistance indicates
that Dodd-Frank is not likely to prevent future TBTF rescues during future episodes of systemic
financial distress. A recent report by Standard & Poor‟s (“S&P”) concluded that Dodd-Frank
does not eliminate the TBTF problem. S&P determined that “under certain circumstances and
with selected systemically important financial institutions, future extraordinary government
support is still possible.”253
Dodd-Frank also relies heavily on the same supervisory tools – capital-based regulation
and prudential supervision – that failed to prevent the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s as
well as the current financial crisis. The reforms contained in Dodd-Frank depend for their
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effectiveness on many of the same federal regulatory agencies that failed to stop excessive risktaking by financial institutions during the credit booms that preceded both crises. As Simon
Johnson and James Kwak observe:
[S]olutions that depend on smarter, better regulatory supervision and corrective action
ignore the political constraints on regulation and the political power of the large banks.
The idea that we can simply regulate large banks more effectively assumes that regulators
will have the incentive to do so, despite everything we know about regulatory capture and
political constraints on regulation.254
The future effectiveness of the FSOC is also open to serious question in light of the agency turf
battles and other bureaucratic failings that have plagued similar multi-agency oversight bodies in
other fields of regulation (e.g., the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence).255
As an alternative to Dodd-Frank‟s regulatory reforms, Congress could have addressed the
TBTF problem directly by mandating a breakup of large financial conglomerates. That is the
approach advocated by Johnson and Kwak, who have proposed maximum size limits of four
percent of GDP (about $570 billion in assets) for commercial banks and two percent of GDP
(about $285 billion of assets) for securities firms. Those size caps would require a significant
reduction in size for the six largest U.S. banking organizations (BofA, Chase, Citigroup, Wells
Fargo, Goldman and Morgan Stanley).256 Like Joseph Stiglitz, Johnson and Kwak maintain that
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“[t]he best defense against a massive financial crisis is a popular consensus that too big to fail is
too big to exist.”257
Congress did not follow the approach recommended by Johnson, Kwak and Stiglitz. In
fact, the Senate rejected a similar proposal for maximum size limits by almost a two-to-one
vote.258 As noted above, Congress modestly strengthened Riegle-Neal‟s 10% nationwide deposit
cap. However, that provision does not restrict “failing bank” mergers, intrastate mergers or
acquisitions, or organic (internal) growth by LCFIs. In addition, Congress gave FSOC and the
FRB broad discretion to decide whether to impose a 10% nationwide liabilities cap on mergers
and acquisitions involving financial companies. LCFIs will undoubtedly seek to block the
adoption of any such liabilities cap.
I am sympathetic to the maximum size limits proposed by Johnson and Kwak. However,
it seems highly unlikely – especially in light of megabanks‟ enormous political clout – that
Congress could be persuaded to adopt such draconian limits, absent a future disaster comparable
to the present financial crisis.259
A third possible approach – and the one I advocate – would be to impose structural
requirements and activity limitations that would (i) prevent LCFIs from using the federal safety
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net protections for their subsidiary banks to subsidize their speculative activities in the capital
markets, and (ii) make it easier for regulators to separate banks from their nonbank affiliates if
FHCs or their subsidiary banks fail. As originally proposed, the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln
Amendment would have barred proprietary trading and private equity investments by banking
organizations and would have forced banks to spin off their derivatives trading and dealing
activities into nonbank affiliates. However, the House-Senate conferees on Dodd-Frank greatly
weakened both provisions and postponed their effective dates. In addition, both provisions as
enacted contain potential loopholes that will allow LCFIs to lobby regulators for further
concessions. Consequently, neither provision is likely to be highly effective in restraining risktaking or the spread of safety net subsidies by LCFIs.
My proposals for a pre-funded OLF, a repeal of the SRE, and a two-tiered system of bank
regulation would provide a simple, straightforward strategy for accomplishing the goals of
shrinking safety net subsidies and minimizing the need for taxpayer-financed bailouts of SIFIs.
A pre-funded OLF would require all SIFIs to pay risk-based assessments to finance the future
costs of resolving failed SIFIs. A repeal of the SRE would prevent the DIF from being used as a
backdoor mechanism to protect uninsured creditors of megabanks. A two-tiered system of bank
regulation would (i) restrict traditional banking organizations to deposit-taking, lending,
fiduciary services and other activities that are “closely related” to banking, and (ii) mandate a
“narrow bank” structure for banks owned by financial conglomerates. In turn, the narrow bank
structure would (A) insulate narrow banks and the DIF from the risks of capital markets
activities conducted by nonbank affiliates, and (B) prevent narrow banks from transferring their
low-cost funding and other safety net subsidies to nonbank affiliates.
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In combination, my proposed reforms would strip away many of the safety net subsidies
that are currently exploited by LCFIs and would subject them to the same type of market
discipline that investors have applied to commercial and industrial conglomerates over the past
thirty years. Financial conglomerates have never demonstrated that they can provide beneficial
services to their customers and attractive returns to their investors without relying on safety net
subsidies during good times and massive taxpayer-funded bailouts during crises. It is long past
time for LCFIs to prove – based on a true market test – that their claimed synergies and their
supposedly superior business model are real and not mythical.260 If, as I suspect, LCFIs cannot
produce favorable returns when they are deprived of their current subsidies and TBTF status,
market forces should compel them to break up voluntarily.
Thank you again for the opportunity to present this testimony.
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. (12/5/11)
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